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INTRODUCTION
The record depicts a course of family controversy and dissen-
sion, beginning before the death of the father and continuing to the
present, characterized by ill will, accusations, recriminations, exten-
sive and expensive litigation, and physical violence ....
Were the suit between David and Arthur personally, much of
the testimony would merit discussion. . . . Perhaps, however, it
needs to be emphasized that the controversy is between majority
and minority stockholders as to dissolution of the corporation, and
unapproved personal sins of contentious members are not to be
visited upon their innocent associates nor used to destroy their
property rights....
In our opinion, the case presents no right to the remedy of
dissolution.'
The image presented by this excerpt evokes the intensely personal
aspects 2 of disputes within closely held corporations. It also illustrates
U.S. law's history of not addressing such aspects or the human relation-
ships that give rise to them. This article will discuss the very different
approaches to resolving close corporation disputes taken by the U.S. and
German legal systems. In Germany, though starting from a position very
similar to the older U.S. approach, the law has come to focus on person-
al elements between stockholders in a closely held corporation.
Closely held corporations present a special concern for any legal
system in that they are usually owned by a small number of sharehold-
ers, are often characterized by personal and flexible management, and
do not have shares that are easily traded on an open market. As a result,
1. Stott Realty Co. v. Orloff, 247 N.W. 698, 699-700 (Mich. 1933).
2. By choosing to coordinate their activities in a corporate form, parties establish a legal
entity that embodies their understanding of how such coordination is to be effected. Many
contemporary observers describe the nature of such an entity as a "nexus of contracts." A
good introduction to this approach is the symposium volume Contractual Freedom in Corpo-
rate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). Although this metaphor is recent, the concept it
expresses has long been an element of U.S. and other legal systems. The content of the
phrase depends upon the nature and significance of the contracts that constitute the corporate
nexus. Concerning shareholders, the contracts generally emphasized in the United States
involve rights and expectations regarding a specific range of largely economic concerns such
as a share of the profits, an interest in the assets, and a voice in the company. These concerns
do not, however, fully capture the ways in which a close corporation impinges on the lives of
the parties to it. The parties not only have a theoretical legal relationship, but also a concrete,
ongoing human relationship. That human relationship has an impact upon matters such as the
psychic gratification of the parties, their sense of fairness, their emotional responses to each
other, and the impact of their business activity on other aspects of their lives. These factors
are examples of "personal aspects."
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the actual functioning of such companies does not always fit neatly into
the categories provided by the formal structure of business law.3
A shareholder confronts the "close corporation problem" when,
faced with a change in circumstances, he or she desires to sever rela-
tions with fellow shareholders but is unable to do so. The difficulty
arises in part from the general lack of a ready market for close corpora-
tion shares. Aggrieved shareholders can. thus be trapped in intolerable
situations. Their plight may be exacerbated by the sometimes imperfect
fit between the formal relationships among the parties established by
law and the factual relationships among them established by life.
All legal systems that provide for a closely held corporate structure
encounter this problem. In developing solutions, all of them must bal-
ance the inevitable tradeoffs. The more narrowly drawn the remedy and
its possible bases, the more the system promotes stability and predict-
ability. At the same time, however, the narrower the solution, the wider
the range of shareholder grievances that remain unsolved, and the more
acute the "close, corporation problem." Conversely, the more broadly
defined and discretionary the remedy and the greater the range of griev-
ances that can be addressed, the less able the system is to promote
stability and predictability.
Traditionally, U.S. remedies were limited, and the bases for obtain-
ing them were narrowly defined. The resulting hardship to parties has
prompted experiments with more open-ended solutions and greater
reliance on judicial discretion.4 These recent developments in U.S. law
have suggested practical mechanisms as well as new normative ap-
proaches. Although they usually developed without reference to German
law, these new U.S. approaches move in the direction of those with
which the Germans have had seven decades of experience and which
they have carried through to their conclusion. By surveying the German
experience, this article will provide a comparative and historical per-
spective for recent U.S. developments. On a more fundamental level, the
fact that German law takes for granted legal assumptions that seem
unthinkable in the context of traditional U.S. doctrine gives us a more
concrete basis for evaluating the implications of such assumptions for
the U.S. legal system.
U.S. law's traditional remedy for the "close corporation problem"
was court-ordered dissolution of the corporation. The basis for obtaining
3. See infra note 20 for a fuller discussion of the German legal system's response to the
need to treat the closely held company as a special business entity.
4. See infra part II.A.
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this remedy was the economic inviability of the company.5 The law did
not grant dissolution to resolve the broader range of problems caused by
personal conflicts. As a result, many shareholders saw their problems
compounded by the loss of personal autonomy entailed by their difficul-
ty in extricating themselves from their companies. Even when relief was
granted, dissolution was a drastic remedy that meant extinction of the
company and a resulting loss of some of its value as a going concern
and all of the psychic value derived from it by its shareholders.6
More recent approaches in the United States have broadened the
availability of relief and have recognized a greater variety of remedies.7
In order to address some of the personal concerns of close corporation
shareholders, courts have looked beyond the economic viability of the
company to questions of fiduciary obligations between shareholders and
oppression of minority shareholders.8 Fiduciary concepts such as fair
dealing and good faith expand the bases for relief, but they remain
circumscribed by doctrinal limits when applied to shareholders. 9 Once
the right to relief has been recognized, U.S. courts and legislators have
created remedies such as shareholder buyouts, third-party arbitration,
and the appointment of provisional directors.' ° All of these remedies
enable the corporation to continue its existence. The limits of fiduciary
doctrines and the respective strengths and weaknesses of the newer
remedies, however, have sometimes led to a greater desire for open-
ended judicial discretion in fashioning appropriate relief.
Although they started with a statutory approach very similar to the
traditional U.S. approach," German courts have created a body of case
law that differs sharply from U.S. law in its mechanisms for relief and
its underlying concepts. Germany thus presents a model of a highly
developed and influential alternative legal system in which concerns
very similar to those facing U.S. shareholders, and statutory provisions
very similar to those provided by earlier U.S. law, interact with funda-
mentally different assumptions about close corporations. The German
analogue of the close corporation is the GmbH (Limited Liability Com-
pany), in which a small number of shareholders own shares without a
ready market in a company often characterized by a flexible manage-
5. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. As applied to shareholders, fiduciary duties have often been discussed in the context
of potential oppression of minority shareholders. See infra note 179.
10. See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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ment structure. 2 The GmbH is by far the most common type of corpo-
rate entity in what is an increasingly important economy. 3 Its signifi-
cance is not confined to Germany itself; German law has been a model
for legal development in many parts of the world, including East Asia.'
4
Although specific provisions of company law (such as rules for dispute
resolution) differ widely among countries, knowledge of the German
system is important to an understanding of its non-European progeny.
As the harmonization process with respect to the business law of Europ-
ean Community Member States continues, the legal practices of a
reunified Germany will have added significance in Europe.
The significance of convergences and differences between U.S. and
German legal approaches, however, cannot be understood on the level of
instrumental concerns and statutory provisions alone. Such seemingly
narrow and technical doctrines of corporate law do not exist in isolation;
they are inevitably linked to deeper assumptions of their legal cultures.
Evaluation of legal approaches must take these links into account. The
law should be illuminated by looking at the manner in which doctrines
have been put to use over time and in the context of their legal cultures.
In the case of Germany, proper evaluation should consider German
company law doctrines not only from the perspective of the powerful
and democratic Germany of today, but also from the perspective of the
Nazi Germany of the all too recent past.
The remainder of this article will examine the German legal sys-
tem's experience with fashioning remedies for the "close corporation
problem" and the underlying concepts that have shaped these remedies.
Part I will trace the growth of the doctrines of withdrawal and expulsion
in the context of Germany's troubled history. Part II will compare
German and U.S. approaches on both practical and conceptual levels.
On one level, the focus of the article is narrow. It deals with specific,
12. See infra note 20. The reader should note, however, that the cumbersome require-
ments of the German public company form lead many companies with quite large capitaliza-
tion, scale of operations, and workforces to organize as GmbH. This factor is what leads some
German commentators to discuss "capitalist" and "personal" companies. Case law has not
found this distinction to affect the availability of the remedies discussed in this article. See
infra note 118.
13. In 1990, there were 2,682 AGs valued at 149,109,000,000 DM and 433,731 GmbHs
valued at 195,815,000,000 DM. See STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR DAS VEREINTE DEUTSCH-
LAND 141 (1991).
14. In China, Japan, and Korea, civil codes were adopted in the twentieth century based
heavily on the German code. Legal vocabulary and the institutional structures of the legal
systems in these countries were also strongly influenced by German concepts. In the field of
company law, Japan adopted a Limited Liability Corporation Law in 1938 (Yfigen Kaisha
H6) that was closely based on the German GmbH Law. Its statutory provisions for dispute
resolution are very similar to those of its German model.
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technical solutions to only the most extreme examples of the close
corporation problem. Such cases are not frequently litigated. Their
doctrines do, however, constitute default rules that can affect the be-
havior of parties. Because they ultimately balance shareholders' obliga-
tions of good faith against their property interest in maintaining control,
such doctrines provide a useful test case.
The broader implications of withdrawal, expulsion, and the "substan-
tial basis" behind-them make these doctrines a useful prism through
which to view underlying assumptions of corporate law. To the extent
that approaches recently suggested in the U.S. close corporation context
resemble those that have been put into effect in Germany, a study of
German law can help us better evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
such approaches. With respect to other practices that are alien to U.S.
approaches, examining concepts and practices taken for granted in one
system, but unthinkable in the other, helps us better understand the
relation between corporate doctrines and their legal cultures.
In Germany, the tragic history of the twentieth century provides
another revealing dimension. The slow and consistent development of
the law of GmbH dispute resolution contrasts with the social and politi-
cal cataclysms that Germany has faced in this century. This pattern of
steady development has been used by some to support the notion that
GmbH remedies are independent of their ideological context.' 5 The role
of legal scholars in some of the more painful episodes of modem Ger-
man history has been a matter of controversy.' 6 Unlike their colleagues
in criminal and constitutional law, corporate experts have generally been
considered far removed from the political aspects of German ideology.
The two German remedies of withdrawal and expulsion 7 in a close
corporation context provide a concrete vantage point from which to
consider the ideological underpinnings of GmbH law.
The deeper level of German experience can best be understood by
placing it in this historical context. The German doctrines of withdrawal
and expulsion have been expressed in consistent terms, but they have
existed in three very different eras of modern German history. The
doctrines were initially suggested during the Weimar period,' 8 when
courts generally restricted themselves to statutory dissolution as provid-
15. See, e.g., FRANZ SCHOLZ, AUSSCHLIESSUNG UND AUSTRITT EINES GESELLSCHAFTERS
AUS DER GMBH (1950).
16. See INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 68-84,
235-39 (Deborah Schneider trans., 1991).
17. See infra part 1.
18. The German Weimar period is recognized as the years 1919-1933.
(Vol. 15:127
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ed in the GmbH Law and viewed these new remedies of withdrawal and
expulsion as narrowly drawn exceptions to the traditional dissolution
remedy. The universal availability of withdrawal and expulsion remedies
for all GmbH shareholders existed during that time only as a theoretical
proposal, urged on normative grounds. As we shall see, acceptance by
the German legal system of these two new principles occurred during
the Third Reich. 9 In the postwar period, these principles have continued
to govern the German approach, though courts have administered them
in new ways. Comparing the way in which a single set of normative
assumptions operated in three very different historical contexts illumi-
nates both the assumptions underlying the German approach and the
potential dangers of that approach.
I. THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE WITH EXPULSION AND WITHDRAWAL
IN THE GMBH
Before tracing the historical development of the withdrawal and
expulsion doctrines, it is helpful to summarize briefly what those terms
presently mean in German law. A fuller discussion of contemporary
practice can be found in Part I.B.
A widely-noted aspect of German corporate law is its treatment of
what U.S. law calls a closely held corporation as a separate category of
legal entity with its own governing statute.2' The closely held GmbH is
19. The Nazi Era is recognized as the years 1933-1945.
20. The starting point for any analysis of German company law is the sharp distinction
drawn in Germany between the publicly held corporation, the Aktiengesellschaft (AG), and
the more closely held limited liability company, the Geselischaft mit beschrdnkter Haftung
(GmbH). For a century, the German legal system has recognized the fundamental differences
between such entities by establishing separate legal regimes for them. The GmbH Law of
1892 provides for many of the attributes that later characterized U.S. close corporation
statutes. This aspect of German company law was widely noted in U.S. legal literature at the
time those statutes were formulated. See, e.g., Henry P. DeVries & Friedrich K. Juenger,
Limited Liability Contract: The GmbH, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1964); Wyatt R. Haskell,
The American Close Corporation and Its West German Counterpart: A Comparative Study 21
ALA. L. REV. 287 (1968); Dieter Schneider, The American Close Corporation and Its German
Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAW. 228 (1958); Joseph L. Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close
Corporation, 27 MIcH. L. REv. 273 (1929); Norman Winer, Proposing a New York "Close
Corporation Law," 28 CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1943).
Given the sui generis nature of the GmbH, one may question whether the close corpora-
tion is an appropriate entity with which to compare it. The newly emerging entity of the
Limited Liability Company is sometimes said to resemble the GmbH. A comprehensive
introduction to this new form is Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A
Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375 (1992). The U.S. Limited Liability, Compa-
ny, however, is much closer in its structure and operation to a limited partnership than is a
GmbH. The German courts have stressed the distinction between the limited partnership and
the GmbH in discussing dispute resolution issues. The statutory provisions of the GmbH for
dispute resolution resemble U.S. corporate provisions. The GmbH management structure,
while flexible, resembles the U.S. closely held corporation more than it does the limited
Fall 19931
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governed by the Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrdnkter
Haftung, of April 20, 1892 (GmbH Law). The GmbH Law's solution to
the close corporation deadlock problem is court-ordered dissolution of
the enterprise. Section 61 of the GmbH Law provides that:
(1) The company may be dissolved by a court decision in case it
becomes impossible to accomplish the purpose of the company or
when there are other substantial causes (wichtige Grund) for the
dissolution resulting from the conditions of the company.2
This solution resembles the older U.S. approach; 22 the dissolution
remedy and the reliance on courts are common to both. The German
statute's expression of the basis for relief, however, is somewhat broad-
er. Inability to accomplish the company's purpose is a concept familiar
to U.S. law. The other concept, a wichtige Grund [substantial basis]
arising from the company's circumstances is unfamiliar to U.S. law, but
the focus on the circumstances of the company rather than on the indi-
vidual shareholders is consistent with older U.S. doctrines. The dissolu-
tion remedy itself has been criticized in Germany as it has been in the
United States. The leading post-war German decision on the subject
stresses the fact that dissolution leads to a loss of business and a loss of
jobs.23
Because the GmbH Law provides no other solutions, German courts
have sought over a seventy year period to fashion their own remedies.
The result has been the creation of a "common law" of dispute resolu-
tion having only a tenuous relationship to the applicable GmbH statute.
partnership. While these similarities make comparison meaningful, one should keep in mind
the unique characteristics of the GmbH.
The GmbH form has a more flexible managerial structure than the AG. The GmbH does
not require a complex formal hierarchy, which may include a separate supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat), unless the size of its workforce calls co-determination laws into effect. GmbHs
are also subject to less intrusive public regulation and disclosure requirements. As in the case
of the U.S. closely held corporation, one characteristic of such companies is the decreased
liquidity of their shares. Minority interests are less easily sold than analogous shares in more
widely held and publicly traded companies. This factor limits the options available to disgrun-
tled shareholders. In the United States, illiquidity is the result of market forces. In Germany
such market forces are expressly reinforced by legal limitations on share transfers. The GmbH
form requires that transfers of shares be accomplished through a notarial act. Unlike their U.S.
namesakes, German notaries are quasi-legal specialists charged with responsibility for
reviewing the provisions of the transfer documents.
21. Law of Apr. 20, 1892, § 61(1) (Ger.) [hereinafter GmbH Law]. See GMBH-GERMAN
LAW CONCERNING THE COMPANIES WITH LIMITED LIABILITy 73 (Rudolf Mueller trans., 3d
ed. 1977).
22. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
23. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, BGH, 9 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 157, 159 (F.R.G.).
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Although such an approach was originally rejected,24 German courts
have come to focus on the factual relationships between the parties and
the personal aspects of those relationships as their primary concern. The
basis for relief is the wichtige Grund [substantial basis]. The content of
this concept will be discussed at length below. Wichtige Grund address-
es a wide range of personal factors and may arise from circumstances
that involve the company or the shareholders personally. It does not
require an element of fault, and thus, it is much broader than the U.S.
concept of fiduciary duty, which comprises factors such as disloyalty,
self-dealing, oppression, and bad faith. The extremely vague and open-
ended language of the applicable German concepts has given judges
wide discretion in resolving GmbH disputes.
When a wichtige Grund has been established, modern German
courts have recognized two remedies for the resolution of intractable
disputes in the GmbH in addition to dissolution: Austritt [withdrawal]
and Ausschliefiung [expulsion] .25 Neither is mentioned in the governing
statute. Both, however, are held by case law to be mandatory rights of
shareholders that cannot be overridden by a company's articles. They
function as necessary complements to each other. Withdrawal ensures
that aggrieved shareholders can disengage from a company in spite of
the illiquidity of their shareholder interest. To some extent, the with-
drawal remedy resembles buyout provisions that have been used in the
United States.26 The withdrawal remedy, however, means that aggrieved
shareholders may have to forego their relationship with the company
and leave it in the hands of those who were the source of their dissatis-
faction. When a continuing relationship with the company is of personal
importance to the shareholder, the result of withdrawal is a psychic loss
to him or her and a corresponding benefit to the shareholders whose
behavior caused the problem.27
24. See infra part I.B.
25. See ADOLF BAUMBACH & ALFRED HUECK, GMBH-GESETz 361-72 (14th ed. 1985);
ROBERT FISCHER et al., GMBH-GESETZ: KOMMENTAR 290-93 (1987); HACHENBURG, GESETZ
BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG (GMBHG): GROSS-KOMMENTAR
(Georg Hohner et al. eds., 7th ed. 1985) (hereinafter HACHENBURG]; 2 GONTHER H. ROTH,
GMnHG 582-91 (1987); HEINZ ROWEDDER ET AL., GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE
GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRXNKTER HAFTUNG 501-22 (1985); Heinz Winter, in SCHOLZ,
KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBH GESETZ § 15, 113-53 (Georg Crezelius et al. eds., 7th ed. 1978);
D. SCHULZE ZUR WIESCHE, GMBH-TASCHENBUCH 56-60 (1989); ILIAS SOUFLEROS,.
AUSSCHLIESSUNG UND ABFINDUNG EINES GMBH-GESELLSCHAFTERS 1-27 (1983).
26. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
27. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, 9 BGHZ at 159-60 points out that if complaining
shareholders must choose between giving up their own livelihood and putting up with an
unbearable shareholder, they have no effective remedy. Hence, there is also a need for
expulsion.
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This potential shortcoming of the withdrawal remedy is ameliorated
by the expulsion remedy. Expulsion leaves the aggrieved party in con-
trol while removing the source of the company's problems. It provides
the sharpest point of comparison with U.S. law. German courts have
found the right of expulsion so fundamental to fairness among share-
holders that they have held explicitly that a minority shareholder can
expel a majority shareholder if wichtige Grund can be established. 2' The
relational obligations of shareholders to each other thus take priority
over the property right of majority shareholders to proportional voting
power in the company. U.S. law also places some constraints on the
exercise of voting power by majority shareholders. The ability of a
minority to expel a majority from a German company, however, is a
much more drastic remedy. Expulsion most clearly exposes the tension
between the legal structure of the corporation and the underlying person-
al relations of the shareholders. The creation of such a remedy by the
German legal system illustrates the degree of importance it attaches to
those relations.
A. Historical Development
1. The Weimar Era
In the GmbH context, the issue of expulsion first arose in the fa-
mous December 7, 1920 case regarding the Albatroswerke GmbH.29 The
Albatros case involved a GmbH that was initially organized as a two-
shareholder company with the shares split equally between the plaintiff
and the defendant. The defendant was convictedin 1915 of treason and
sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment and a 3,000 DM fine. The
plaintiff sued for court-ordered dissolution pursuant to the GmbH Law
because the defendant had refused to vote his share for voluntary dis-
solution. The dissolution was ordered in 1917, whereupon the defendant
and a third party organized a new company to buy the assets of Al-
batros. In the current suit, the plaintiff sought damages for losses result-
ing from the delay in acquiring Albatros occasioned by the defendant's
allegedly wrongful refusal to vote for voluntary dissolution.
The intermediate appeals court accepted the plaintiff's arguments. It
found the parties to have determined that the internal structure of the
28. See infra text accompanying note 124.
29. Judgment of Dec. 7, 1920, RGH, 101 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Zivilsachen [RGZ] 55 (Ger.).
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GmbH would resemble a partnership. 30 The court opinion stressed the
mutual obligations of the parties and the closeness of their personal
relationship.3' Despite the technical requirements of the GmbH form, the
intermediate court held that, because of the essentially partnership-like
reality of the company in question, provisions of the Commercial Code
dealing with the treatment of expelled partners should apply by analo-
gy.32 These provisions required expelled partners to disgorge profits
accruing after the filingof a suit for expulsion. The standard was that of
the wichtige Grund [substantial basis].
The Supreme Court firmly rejected this approach. It emphasized the
fundamental differences between the GmbH and a partnership. It held
that treating one business entity by using concepts drawn from two
distinct forms, partnership and GmbH, was "unthinkable. 34 Because.the
relevant provisions of partnership law were ancillary to the expulsion
remedy, they could not be applied. To do otherwise would be to intro-
duce a completely alien concept into the law of the GmbH.35 The Su-
preme Court concluded that:
Such an expulsion of a shareholder is unknown in the GmbH. It
knows only dissolution as the means for ending a legally constitut-
ed GmbH.
3 6
The Court based its analysis on the distinction between the "internal"
and "external" aspects of a company's existence. With respect to the
former, the flexible GmbH form allowed shareholders to arrange their
relationships inter se to resemble other business forms. These arrange-
ments, however, could have no impact on the latter, which involved the
company's relations with the outside world. The key element of the
external aspect was the separate legal personality of the GmbH.37 Expul-
sion was incompatible with the independent personality of the GmbH.
The implications for mechanisms of company decisionmaking and for
title in company property made statutory dissolution the exclusive
30. Id. at 55-56.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The concept of wichtige Grund dealt with matters that had a profound impact on the
parties involved in ongoing relationships such as partnership, employment contracts, and the
like. For a discussion of the role of wichtige Grund in the GmbH, see infra notes 108-11 and
accompanying text.
34. Judgment of Dec. 7, 1920, RGH, 101 RGZ 55-56 (Ger.).
35. Id. at 58.
36. Id. at 60.
37. Id. at 61-62.
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vehicle for involuntary termination of a GmbH shareholding. Provisions
of the Commercial Code ancillary to expulsion derived from other
business forms could not, therefore, be applied to the GmbH. Likewise,
despite the close relationship between shareholders, the general concept
of wichtige Grund could not be transferred from the fields of partnership
and personal performance to the GmbH.38
The Supreme Court's formalistic rejection of the expulsion remedy
established the basic approach of Weimar courts. Only in two narrow
areas did the courts carve out an exception and accept the principle of
wichtige Grund. The first area involved companies associated with
cartels.39 If shareholders became unable to fulfill obligations owed to the
cartel, withdrawal or expulsion might be available if holding shares
required the fulfillment of the obligations. 40 Later, a February 7, 1930
decision expanded this exception to include all Nebenleistungs-
gesellschaft [companies in which the maintenance of shareholder status
required performance of services in addition to payment of money for
shares] .4' These exceptions did not conflict with the principles laid down
in the Albatros case; the GmbH Law recognized the possibility of
removing shareholders who had not paid consideration for their shares.42
Both of the new judge-made exceptions of withdrawal and expulsion
extended this principle. In each case it would have been anomalous for
shareholders to remain in companies when they were unable to fulfill
obligations to the company that, were the basis of their shareholding. It
was precisely the independent personality of the GmbH and the legal
effect of the company's property rights that established a narrow wich-
tige Grund for the limited availability of withdrawal or expulsion.
Despite the narrow holdings of the Weimar courts, an October 30,
1930 decision contained general language that would be adopted by later
courts.43 In considering withdrawal from an association, the decision
stated that "a legal relationship that impinged strongly on the
Lebenstatigkeit [life experience] of a party can be terminated before the
38. Id. at 62.
39. German industrial organization during this period was characterized by the wide-
spread establishment of cartels, which were organized groups of companies in which the
member companies would coordinate their business and marketing activities.
40. Judgment of July 2, 1926, RGH, 114 RGZ 213 (Ger.). The Hefeverband facts
involve shareholders whose cartel obligations were terminated pursuant to another statute.
Continued performance of required obligations to the GmbH was therefore impossible.
41. Judgment of Feb. 7, 1930, RGH, 128 RGZ 1 (Ger.).
42. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
43. Judgment of Oct. 30, 1930, RGH, 130 RGZ 375, 378 (Ger.).
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end of its term if a substantial basis led to it."" This principle would be
expanded in subsequent decades in cases dealing with the GmbH.
For the time being, however, this broad language was not exploited
by the courts. They cautiously extended the nonstatutory remedies of
expulsion and withdrawal only in cases where it served to effectuate
rights that were provided by statute but impeded by circumstances.
These extensions remained exceptions to the general rule that nonstatu-
tory rights were unavailable. -General clauses such as wichtige Grund
were carefully circumscribed when applied to the governance of compa-
nies.
The courts' hesitation to derive new rights of withdrawal and expul-
sion from the broad language of general clauses stood in sharp contrast
to the legal movement then transforming German, civil law. In fields
such as contracts, finance, and labor regulation, general clauses provided
activist courts with a basis upon which to introduce greater flexibility in
applying the formalistic Civil Code.45 In doing so, the courts sought to
maintain the legitimacy of the German legal system in the face of
harrowing social crises. The greatest of these was the hyperinflation that
ruined many.
In 1923 at the height of hyperinflation, old German marks were
valued in new marks at the rate of one trillion toone.46 The astonishing
rate of inflation was matched by the suddenness and unpredictability of
disruptions in contractual expectations. ,Famous, anecdotes of people
transporting wheelbarrows full of currency only 'to discover that prices
had risen again while they were en route to a store evoke the harsh
reality. That reality made the enforcement of contract terms agreed to in
earlier times a windfall for some and ruin for others. The field of con-
tracts was therefore one of the first fields in which the new flexible
approach took hold.
The most widely used of the general clauses was Civil Code section
242 Treu und Glaube [good faith], which will be discussed in Part 11.
4 1
This section of the Code expresses an underlying norm of fairness that
courts have read into other sections of the Code. During the first two
decades of the Code's operation, however, section 242 was largely
ignored, and it certainly did not have the broad applicability it later
44. Id.
45. See JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 461-79 (1968).
46. John P. Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany 1914-1924, at
33 MICH. L. REV. 171, 174 (1934):
47. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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acquired. The expansion of section 242 began with a Supreme Court
case dealing with the provision of steam heat under a long-term lease
when the cost of steam heat had risen exponentially. 49 Although it
remained highly controversial at the time and was constrained by many
limiting doctrines, the Court's reasoning provided a point of departure
during the following decade when economic conditions deteriorated
markedly:
The first and highest duty of the judge in his decisions is to re-
spond to the imperative needs of life and to let himself be guided
by the experience of life .... [Prior decisions] have been overrid-
den by the experiences this court has had during the further course
of the war and particularly through its unexpected outcome and the
resulting upsetting of all economic conditions. These conditions
clearly require the intervention of the judge in existing contract
relations when a situation would result that would contradict every
command of justice and fairness and would be simply intolerable."
This invitation to judicial intervention met with considerable opposition.
In fact, judicial intervention was antithetical to the systematic structure
of the Civil Code. Flexible application of vaguely worded norms on a
case-by-case basis undermined clarity, consistency, and predictability,
which were important goals of the Civil Code. When the course of
events impelled courts to intervene, ironically they turned to ideas
unsuccessfully advanced during the previous century by Bernhard
Windscheid for legitimation.5'
The systematic nature of the Civil Code was itself partly a testament
to Windscheid's formalism. The initial drafting of the Civil Code was
carried out under his influence. Nevertheless, Windscheid's theory of the
stillschweigende Voraussetzung [tacit presupposition] served as thebasis
for judicial intervention by courts in the 1920s. Windscheid argued that
all volitional acts involved the interaction of volition with presupposi-
tions.52 In fact, presuppositions helped define the purpose of a volitional
48. DAWSON, supra note 45, at 465-66. See also ARTHUR VON MEHREN & JAMES
GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1066-99 (1977) (giving detailed treatment of this
development and including some case translations).
49. Judgment of Sept. 21, 1920, RGH, 100 RGZ 129 (Ger.); DAWSON, supra note 45, at
465-66. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50. DAWSON, supra note 45, at 466. See also VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 48,
at 1076.
51. DAWSON, supra note 45, at 467-68. See also infra notes 53-55 and accompanying
text.
52. See 1 BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS 507-19 (1906).
See also DAWSON, supra note 45, at 467; VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 48, at 1045.
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act. They could be expressly declared, or they could be implicit in the
will manifested by other aspects of the act. In an act with legal conse-
quences, when the presuppositions ceased to obtain, the legal conse-
quences of the act no longer' reflected the will of the parties. If the will
of the parties was a relevant consideration, the legal consequences
needed reformation.
Windscheid's theory was rejected by his contemporaries and by the
other drafters of the Civil Code.53 The drafters' interest in maintaining
the logical completeness of the Code system revealed the degree to
which they were influenced by the formalism that characterized
Windscheid's own general approach. A strong objection to Windscheid's
tacit presumption theory was that the theory undermined certainty in the
law and in transactions. In an article written during the year of his
death, Windscheid acknowledged the threat to certainty that would be
posed by his theory in the hands of unreflective judges. 54 He felt, how-
ever, that such cases would be anomalous and that rules of construction
would limit the danger. He labeled the drafters' objection a "phantom"
and urged that it should not lead the legal system to rob judges of a
useful tool for effectuating their sense of justice.5 In a famous state-
ment, Windscheid predicted that his theory would inevitably work its
way into German legal practice:
It is my firm conviction that the tacit presupposition, no matter
what may be objected against it, will again be reinstated ...
Thrown out the door, it will come back in through the window. 6
Despite the abstract deductive reasoning supporting his theory,
Windscheid's defense of his position was ultimately premised on his
hopeful estimation of the good faith and reasoning ability of German
judges.5
In the hyperinflation and economic dislocation of the 1920s, tacit
presuppositions often failed to obtain. In the realm of economic rela-
tions, the most common vehicles for achieving fairness became the Civil
Code's general clauses regarding Treu und Glaube [good faith] and
wichtige Grund [substantial basis]. The former concept was applied
53. See WINDSCHEID, supra note 52, at 507-19. See also DAWSON, supra note 45, at
467; VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 48, at 1045.
54. Bernhard Windscheid, Die Voraussetzung, 78 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS
161, 197 (1892).
55. Id.
56. DAWSON, supra note 45, at 467 (citing windscheid, supra note 54).
57. Windscheid, supra note 54, at 197.
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widely in the field of contracts, and the latter applied to matters involv-
ing ongoing relationships or personal obligations. The two concepts
often involved overlapping subject matter. As will be discussed in Part
I.B, both concepts have come to play an important role in the law of the
GmbH, which is created by contract and involves an ongoing personal
relationship. This apparently obvious linkage emerges in hindsight and
in view of later legal developments. During the 1920s, these connections
did not appear obvious to German courts.
The general application of section 242 to the field of contracts
opened the floodgates of a new type of litigation. Parties asked courts to
reform the terms of agreements in order to achieve fairness." Judges
thus spent more and more time dealing with questions of valuation in a
range of complex situations with little more to guide them than the
vague language of section 242 and their own consciences. The concept
of wichtige Grund led to similar intervention in matters involving per-
sonal services.5 9 The tacit presuppositions in such cases dealt with the
parties and with the relationships between them that underlay the legal
forms in question. Issues of personality were no more amenable to
general rules than were transactional issues. As in the case of section
242, the clauses dealing with wichtige Grund provided little more than
rhetorical guidance to judges taking a case-by-case approach. Such fact-
based legal reasoning, with its heavy reliance on judicial discretion, was
a sharp break from the formalistic tradition of the Civil Code.
6
0
Despite the increasingly common judicial resort to section 242 and
to the doctrine of wichtige Grund, there was remarkable reluctance to
apply either clause to the questions of expulsion and withdrawal from
the GmbH. As we have seen, the general clauses were only used in this
context to effectuate rights and obligations specifically created by provi-
sions of the GmbH Law. The use of general clauses to create funda-
mental rights of withdrawal and expulsion as inherent elements of
GmbH shareholding was not embraced by the German legal system for
another decade - under a considerably different political and intellectu-
al climate.
The reticence of courts with respect to GmbH law did not extend to
the fields of commercial and employment law. By 1933, the widespread
resort to general clauses had begun to raise alarm about the predictabili-
ty of law and the discretionary power of judges. In his famous work,
The Flight into the General Clauses, Hedeman warned against the
58. DAWSON, supra note 45, at 468-76.
59. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
60. See DAWSON, supra note 45, at 472-73.
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dangers of this new trend.6' Other authors complained of the "monstrous
cult of precedents" that had developed. Hedeman's critique was more
fundamental; he stressed the threat posed by unconstrained judicial
discretion. In his view, the obliteration of clear legal rules in the name
of general clauses removed the constraints on discretion. He adduced as
an example the supplanting of Roman law by Byzantine despotism in
which "[t]he absolute emperor proclaims in the name of equity the
authority of the imperial will, unrestrained by law." 62 Just as Hedeman's
work was being released by the publisher, Adolf Hitler took power as
chancellor of Germany. Ironically, Hedeman would become an honored
member of the Nazi legal establishment.
63
2. The Third Reich
The broad application of general clauses, such as wichtige Grund
and Treu und Glaube, to enable withdrawal and expulsion in the GmbH
context was not adopted by the German courts until 1942.' Prior to that
time, courts used the general clauses to carve out narrowly drawn excep-
tions to the rule that dissolution was the only remedy available for
disputes within closely held corporations. The famous case of August
13, 1942 established the approach discussed in Part I.B and remains a
leading case today.65
The 1942 case involved a real estate holding company originally
organized as a GmbH with three shareholders having equal shares. Al-
though the company had been reorganized by shareholder agreement
61. Id. at 475-76; 1. W. HEDEMAN, DIE FLUCHT IN DIE GENERALKLAUSELN (1933).
62. DAWSON, supra note 45, at 476.
63. Id.
64. In 1942, the Nazi party increased its effort to influence the outcome of judicial cases.
Judges whose formalistic reliance on earlier legal principles led to results unfavorable to Nazi
policies came under greater pressure from this time on.
65. Judgment of Aug. 13, 1942, RGH, 169 RGZ 330 (Ger.). Such private law develop-
ments during the Third Reich change our perspective on the debate over the nature and role
of Nazi law. In their famous articles, H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller address the issue of whether
Nazi law could be considered "law" in any meaningful sense. The challenge of the Nazi
experience forced them to test their conceptions of the definition of law. H.L.A. Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon L.
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1958). Hart and Fuller emphasized Nazi legislation and criminal procedure. In these areas,
Nazi policies dominated the language of the law themselves. These laws, however, should not
be equated with the "law as a whole" of the Nazi period. Such legislation existed in the
context of a larger body of law that continued seemingly unchanged from the pre-Nazi era.
The interaction of this body of traditional law with Nazi policies must be taken into account
in order to have a balanced view of the legal system's function during the Third Reich.
GmbH law is one example among many of Nazi policies' impact on the pre-existing body of
civil law.
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into another form, that agreement provided that all relations among the
shareholders and between the shareholders and the company would con-
tinue to be governed by the provisions relating to a GmbH. The issue of
expulsion was therefore analyzed in terms of a GmbH. Two
shareholders in the 1942 case made a request for expulsion premised on
the general clause wichtige Grund. The complaining shareholders
claimed that the continued presence of the third shareholder in the com-
pany had become unbearable. As a result, good faith obliged the third
shareholder to leave,66 and if he refused to do so he should be expelled.
The substantial basis in question was that the shareholder, M, was a
Jew. In 1938, the other shareholders invited M to a meeting whose
agenda was to deal with claims against the shareholders and "miscella-
neous" matters. M did not attend, and he was expelled at the meeting on
the grounds that his Jewishness made his presence in the company
unbearable. Because of new laws restricting Jewish business activities,
M's presence would subject the company to such restrictions. M filed
suit claiming that he was still a shareholder, that there was no substan-
tial basis for his expulsion, and that he had been denied a hearing. The
district court found for M on all counts, despite the recently promulgat-
ed anti-Jewish laws. It held that Jewishness per se did notconstitute a
wichtige Grund, and that since the other shareholders had knowingly
associated themselves with M, they had no grounds for further com-
plaint about his being Jewish.67 In addition, it found that M had been
denied a rightful hearing. On appeal, the appellate court upheld the
decision of the district court. This decision was in turn appealed. By the
time the matter reached the Supreme Court, circumstances had worsened
for M. His property had been forfeited to the State under Nazi law, and
he had become, in the words of the court, an "6migr" Jew.
In overturning the appellate court, the Supreme Court asserted both
the conclusion that Jewishness constituted a substantial basis for expul-
sion and the broader premise that expulsion was an inherent right in the
GmbH - even when a company's articles were silent on the issue.68
The Court based its opinion largely on the theories advanced in 1942 by
Franz Scholz in Expulsion and Withdrawal of a Shareholder from the
GmbH.69 The Court's reliance on the specifics of Scholz's theory ul-
66. See Judgment of Aug. 13, 1942, 169 RGZ at 330-32 (providing a summary of the
facts).
67. Id. at 335-38 (discussing the appellate court's affirmation of the district court's
holding).
68. Id. at 338-39.
69. FRANZ SCHOLZ, AUSSCHLIESSUNG UND AUSTRITT EINES GESELLSCHAFTERS AUS DER
GMBH 18-23 (1942). Note that the original edition of Scholz's book differs considerably from
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timately arose from two deeper assumptions common in Nazi discourse
on corporations and jurisprudence. The assumptions dealt with the
nature of the corporation and the way in which a general clause, such as
wichtige Grund, should be applied.
The German tradition of corporate law had long been characterized
by a debate between the adherents of the realist or "Germanic" view of
the corporation and those of the legal fiction or "Roman" view. For the
former, the corporation's fundamental nature lay in its existence as a set
of social relationships. Group interaction standing alone gave rise to
rights and obligations of group members. The function of the law was to
accord with these underlying realities.70 For the Roman school, the
constitutive elements of society were individuals rather than groups; the
corporation had a real existence but only as a legal fiction. The group
represented by the corporation was created by the law and therefore did
not have an independent source of legal norms.
In its 1942 decision, the Supreme Court used the "Germanic" view
of the corporation, a central tenet of Nazi legal thinking, to break with
the earlier line of expulsion cases. As we have seen, earlier cases ex-
panded the right of expulsion only as an exception and only when it
furthered rights or obligations arising from statutes. In addressing the
limited statutory basis for expulsion, the Court held that the provisions
of the GmbH Law dealt only with matters not already covered by "den
ungeschreibenen, weil zwingenen und selbstverstindlichen Gesellschafts-
willen" [the unwritten because binding and self-evident will of the
corporation]. 71 The Court seemed to imply that, because the unwritten
will of the corporation did not arise from a legal source, it arose from
the social fact of corporate relationships as well as from the unstated
presuppositions of the company charter. The Court went on to describe
the corporate will as characterized by obligations of good faith. These
obligations could be affected by the existence of a wichtige Grund. The
general clauses thus operate directly in the social context of the corpora-
tion without the need for statutory authorization.
The Court's view of corporate existence was linked to a new ap-
the postwar revised version available in U.S. law libraries. This point will be discussed in part
I.A.3.
70. See, e.g., OTTO vON GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (1913).
Gierke was the leading proponent of this school and his ideas had a profound effect on
supporters of this more communitarian view of the corporation. For partial translations, see
OTTO VON GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800 (Ernest
Barker trans., 2d ed. 1960); OTTo VON GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW (George Heiman
trans., 1977); OTTo VON GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Frederic W.
Maitland trans., 2d ed. 1913).
71. Judgment of Aug. 13, 1942, 169 RGZ at 334.
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proach to applying general clauses. This approach was an outgrowth of
Nazi reliance on certain Hegelian concepts, which will be discussed in
Part II. As we have seen, courts of the Weimar era concentrated, on the
concrete realities of the situation facing shareholders or contract parties
inter se. Devastating hyperinflation may have been a general social
phenomenon, but the Weimar courts' analyses centered on the manner in
which the parties obligations to each other were affected. In the case of
M, the district court continued this approach. In holding that M's
Jewishness did not constitute a wichtige Grund, it pointed to the fact
that the other shareholders had knowingly associated with him. Al-
though the external political climate had changed drastically, the funda-
mental relationship between the shareholders had not. .
The Supreme Court found the district court's approach to general
clauses to be in error. In determining whether a wichtige Grund existed,
it was necessary for a court to view the parties' relationship within its
social and political context. 72 Changes in that context mandated a reas-
sessment of the parties' obligations. The Court noted the promulgation
of the anti-Jewish decrees and held that the new "attitude of the German
people" toward the Jews was the perspective from which to analyze the
question of wichtige Grund. Its result was to link the unwritten commu-
nal norms of the corporate entity with the "attitudes" of the German
people. This somewhat mystical continuum was the basis for determin-
ing the deeper realities of the law of associations. Because of the wide-
ranging applicability of the concept of wichtige Grund, the Court's
opinion could provide a legal basis for expelling Jews and other
undesirables while permitting business organizations to continue their
activities without disruption.
Soon after the decision, its reasoning and results were warmly
greeted by Scholz in a brief article in DEUTSCHES RECHT. 73 In his 1942
book, on which the Court relied, Scholz sought to place the law of
business associations, especially the GmbH, in -the context of a few
basic premises. Following the general approach of Nazi jurisprudence,
he stressed the relationship between law, justice, and morality.74 The
proper goal of the legal system should be justice. Justice, Scholz felt,
could only arise when law was in harmony with morality. An important
achievement of the legal system would be to "close the gap between law
and morality so that that which contradicts the healthy views of the
72. Id. at 337.
73. Franz Scholz, Ausschlieflung und Austritt aus der GmbH, 50 DEUTSCHES RECHT
1667 (1942).
74. SCHOLZ, supra note 69, at 18-23.
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people cannot be law."75 In the law of associations, positive law had to
be placed in the context of unwritten, but generally accepted, com-
munity values. The reality of human relationships gave birth to certain
fundamental moral principles such as good faith. All specific legal
provisions must therefore be read in the light of these permeating con-
cepts (which Scholz refers to as the "unwritten law"). They were the
"general legal concepts of the public's moral order, which are called
'general clauses', and which are to be recognized as tacitly inherent in
all legal relationships. 76 He later concluded that "each legal relationship
is governed by the force of the unwritten but binding law of the prin-
ciple of good faith."77 In achieving justice, the legal system should
uphold the principles of honor and Personlichkeit :[personhood]. In-
dividuals in a group achieved their own personhood through member-
ship in the group. Scholz saw the fulfillment of personhood as a princi-
ple that was promoted through the process of expelling certain share-
holders from the GmbH.78 Personhood was a particularly important
concern in the GmbH context because of the close nature of the person-
al relationships between GmbH shareholders. Such concrete realities
were linked to the professed concern of Scholz and. other Nazi legal
thinkers for achieving justice in the individual case through flexible
application of the law.
Scholz was sophisticated enough to recognize the threat to legal
certainty posed by an "elastic" approach to the general clauses. As we
have seen, maintaining legal certainty was a concern of the approach's
opponents for decades. Rather than minimize the importance of this
concern, Scholz embraced it and stressed the centrality, of legal certain-
ty.79 He sought to achieve it in two ways. First, it was important to
select judges who would act in good faith. He admitted that elastic law
in the hands of irresponsible judges could lead to an undermining of the
law. 80 Second, the concept of legal certitude had to be understood on a
deeper level. Traditional views emphasized consistency in terms of what
Scholz called the Paragraphensicherheit [certitude on the paragraph
level of the law]."' Scholz's problem was that "artful" theoretical argu-
ments could produce unexpected results in the name of superficial
75. Id. at 21.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Id. at 22.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 60.
80. Id. at 61.
81. Id.
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consistency. It was therefore necessary to base the search for consisten-
cy on the deeper ground from which the law springs. Scholz character-
ized this shift as moving from Paragraphendenken [paragraph thinking]
to Rechtsdenken [justice thinking].82 He cited Hans Frank and Hermann
G6ring to the effect that this "deeper" concept of legal certainty was "a
basic requirement of communal life and of justice."83 From this per-
spective, true legal certainty was only possible when the law's results
accorded with the people's intuition of justice arising from community
norms.
Scholz's specific work on the issues of expulsion and withdrawal
were consistent with the general Nazi approach to corporate law reform.
A proper treatment of that complex topic is far beyond the scope of this
article. Nevertheless,' it is important to note briefly some of its key
points in order to gain a better understanding of the Nazi embrace of the
expulsion. and withdrawal doctrines.
Nazi corporate reform proceeded under the auspices of two organi-
zations: the Academy for German Law and the Ministry of Justice. The
Academy included many leading law professors and jurists. 4 They were
divided into working groups to study the reform of all branches of the
law under the leadership of Hans Frank, Hitler's lawyer and the future
governor-general of occupied Poland. The Justice Ministry, whose
personnel included career bureaucrats from the pre-Nazi era along with
Nazi activists, was charged with drafting and effectuating specific stat-
utes - often in the light of the Academy's proposals.
Corporate reform initially focused on the publicly held corporation.
The AG legal provisions, such as multiple votes and bearer shares, led
to the perception that power in large corporations was concentrated in
the hands of large financial interests. Nazi rhetoric had long embraced
populist, anti-capitalist attacks on the corporate order. The economic
situation that faced the government during the 1930s, however, was
more complex than such rhetoric. There was a need to harness capital
for the task of economic growth and for the fulfillment of the four year
plan. Calls for a fundamental change in the nature of the corporation
were rejected. The new AG Law promulgated in 1937 included many
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. On the Academy's work in all branches of the law, see DENNIS L. ANDERSON, THE
ACADEMY FOR GERMAN LAW, 1933-1944 (1987). See pages 300-13 for a summary of the
AG reforms discussed below. For a more detailed presentation of the Nazi critique of the
public corporation and proposals for its reform, see Wilhelm Kisskalt, Die Aktiengesellschaft
im nazionalsozialistischen Staat, in NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHES HANDBUCH FOR RECHT UND
GESETZOEBUNG 1136-54 (Hans Frank ed., 1935).
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technical changes, but it maintained traditional provisions such as the
controversial bearer shares. Despite occasional resort to Nazi rhetoric,
the Nazis left the AG form intact and, though amended, the AG Law
remained in force until 1965.
One policy furthered by corporate reform was the encouragement of
greater reliance on forms of business organization such as the GmbH
and the partnership, which the Nazis accomplished by increasing the
minimum capitalization of AGs. The more personal nature of these
entities made them analogous to human social experience and made
their members more accountable. Because the reform of the AG took
into account the availability of the GmbH, many in the legal academic
community felt that the GmbH Law of 1892 should also be revised to
reflect newer approaches to the law. Their proposals included guaran-
teeing the general right to withdrawal and expulsion that the courts had
rejected earlier. The ensuing discussion shows that the Supreme Court's
1942 decision was not an aberration; instead it was consistent with
scholarly opinion both as to normative assumptions and political pro-
grams.
Following a series of discussions held by the Academy for German
Law, in 1939 the Justice Ministry drafted its proposal for a revision of
the GmbH Law. In the Academy, the question of the availability of an
expulsion remedy was placed in the context of the personal aspects of
GmbH shareholding. An Academy report stressed the importance of
focusing on the underlying question of the GmbH's essential nature:
Whether one wishes to permit this suit for expulsion in the legal
sphere of the GmbH or not depends conclusively upon the question
of principle as to whether in the newly constituted GmbH the
personal company elements will be considered so strongly domi-
nant, particularly the view of the bonds between the shareholders
as so striking, that, in contrast to the prior statutory rules, hence-
forth there must be created the possibility of a forced expulsion of
a particular person from the personal union. The attitude toward
this fundamental question is determinative for answering the expul-
sion question. 5
The treatment of the GmbH as a judicial entity apart from its sharehold-
ers, as well as the anonymity it afforded shareholders, were seen as
obstacles to the State's effort to make companies reflect the norms of
85. 2 AKADEMIE FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT, 1933-1945, PROTOKOLLE DER AUSSCHOSSE 541
(Werner Schubert et al. eds., 1986).
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the new legal thinking and the "Fihrer principle."8 6 Long-standing
commonplace Nazi rhetoric claimed that it was necessary to eliminate
the sharp distinction between the company and its shareholders in the
GmbH context.17 The proposed statute that emerged from the Academy
and Ministry's efforts was never enacted, but it illustrates the Nazi
approach to specific issues of GmbH law reform.
Articles 136 and 137 of the proposed law provided for the remedies
of court-ordered expulsion and withdrawal respectively."8 The ground for
expulsion was the existence of a substantial basis caused by a share-
holder personally that made it unacceptable to continue the company
with that shareholder. The grounds for withdrawal were somewhat
narrower; they resembled the U.S. concept of oppression. 9 Shareholders
could seek court-ordered withdrawal when "the majority of the business
partners misuse their position of power in a way that greatly damages
the interests of the other partners that are worthy of protection."'9 The
official commentary linked these remedies to the need for strengthening
the personal elements in the GmbH form:
The proposal begins from this development and seeks to work out
more strongly the features of the personal company in the provi-
sions that govern the internal relationships of the company. Of
significance in this connection are the elaboration of personal law
and the possibility, newly created by this proposal, of the expulsion
and withdrawal of a shareholder, whose effectuation, to be sure, is
bound by strong preconditions.9
For years, Nazi business law theorists had used the concepts of
faithfulness and the relational nature of business activities as the founda-
tion for the GmbH. In doing so, they generally focused on shareholder
obligations to each other. As noted by Scholz and the Supreme Court,
however, the new view of good faith incorporated the obligations of the
parties to the broader community. This perspective often remained
implicit in academic treatments of the GmbH. The need to strengthen
86. This principle linked individuals to the will of the leader, who was a crystallization
of the will of the group he represented. See the general discussion in ENTWURF DES
REICHSJUSTIZMINISTERIUMS ZU EINEM GESETZ OBER GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRXNKTER
HAFTUNG VON 1939, at 35-69 (Werner Schubert ed., 58th ed. 1985) [hereinafter ENTWURF
DES REICHSJ USTI ZMINISTERI UMS].
87. Id. at 42.
88. Id. at 133.
89. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
90. ENTWURF DES REICHSJUSTIZMINISTERIUMS, supra note 86, at 133 (translated by
author).
91. Id. at 149 (translated by author).
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the fiduciary community created by the shareholders of a GmbH was
expressed most clearly in the Nazi legal handbook edited under the
auspices of Hans Frank:
According to the outmoded legal view, the shareholders do not
stand in a 'contractual relationship as to each other and to the
company. There is only the so-called principle of equal treatment
of the shareholders. From this, the shareholders and the company
were only protected by section 138 of the Civil Code from harm
done to the shareholders or the company by an action of a fellow
shareholder who finds himself in possession of a majority of the
shares, and then were only entitled to a claim for damages if there
had been a violation of sections 226 or 826 of the Civil Code.
This legal view stands in sharpest contradiction to the funda-
mental views of National Socialism. One of its major principles is
the principle of faithfulness. The emanation of this fundamental
view of the new legal development should therefore be furthered so
that company law can be governed by the principle of mutual
faithfulness. Between the shareholders of a GmbH and to their
company there is, according to the new legal view a relationship of
faithfulness.
The duty of the reform of GmbH law under the governing
principles of National Socialism must therefore be to give legal
effect to this principle of a relationship of faithfulness established
by the principles of National Socialism.92
Resort to the vocabulary of faithfulness, in theory, linked the GmbH
revisions to the wider movement toward a good faith standard in com-
mercial dealings that had characterized Weimar jurisprudence. The
corresponding shift by legal theorists in the 1930s from focusing on the
parties inter se toward viewing good faith in a broader social context
had a direct effect on the application of Treu und Glaube..
In the postwar years, many have argued that their concepts were
articulated on a purely theoretical level and were not connected to
political programs. As we have seen, the nature of the expulsion remedy
and the need to articulate a basis for it exposes this connection clearly.
Three years before the Supreme Court's opinion, in evaluating some of
the difficulties in applying the proposed expulsion remedy, the Justice
Ministry's theorists took into account the practical realities of the con-
text in which it was to be applied. Despite the consistently high moral
92. Karl A. Crisolli, Das Recht der GmbH, in NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEs HANDBUCH
FOR RECHT UND GESETZGEBUNG 1172 (Hans Frank ed., 1935) (translated by author).
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tone of the normative rationales for the expulsion remedy, the Justice
Ministry's official commentary reveals, as an afterthought, the underly-
ing political ends for which the new GmbH remedy was intended:
Expulsion is bound by no further preconditions, so that a
majority shareholder can also be expelled by a minority. In such a
case, only the payment to the one expelled would raise serious
difficulties. That this would not always be impossible to overcome
is demonstrated by the measures that have been carried out for the
elimination of Jews from the German economy.93
3. Postwar Germany
After World War II, the Nazi development of the rule on expulsion
of GmbH shareholders became controversial.94 In 1949, for example,
Masur condemned the 1942 decision that sanctioned the expulsion rule,
taking care to place the blame on Nazi legislators rather than the justices
of the Supreme Court:
The moral answerability for this legislation falls not on the judge,
but rather on the legislator. That, however, .does not change the
fact that the opinion was a consequence and the practical carrying
out of a criminally false doctrine. Such opinions should be forgot-
ten as quickly as possible, and be caused to be forgotten, and one
should not erect an again healthy law upon them.95
While rejecting the Nazis' view of the basis for expulsion, Masur did
accept the need for the remedy. He sought to limit the use of expulsion
by imposing a fault requirement and applying it in cases where the
unbearable shareholder, in contravention of the obligations imposed by
a good faith reading of the company charter, made it impossible for the
company to carry out its purposes.96
Within a year after the publication of Masur's article, Scholz pub-
93. ENTWURF DES REICHSJUSTIZMINISTERIUMS, supra note 86, at 192 (translated by
author).
94. Schilling and Buchwald took the position that the expulsion remedy was tainted by
its Nazi origins and therefore could not be the basis of a just doctrine. Wolfgang Schilling, in
HACHENBURG, supra note 25, app. I to § 3 (1953 edition); Buchwald, Die Ausschlieflung
eines Gmbh-Gesellschafters aus der Gesellschaft, 16 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 457 (1953).
Bergenroth rejected the Nazi approach and called for more objective standards. Schilling
Bergenroth, Ausschlufi eines Gesellschafters aus der GmbH, in MONATSSCHRIFr FOR
DEUTSCHES RECHT 721, 721-23 (Kurt Mittelstein ed., 1951).
95. Masur, Zum Ausschlufl eines Gesellschafters einer GmbH aus wichtigen Grund, in
NEUE JURISTI$CHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 407 (1949).
96. Id. at 408-409.
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lished a revised version of his book.97 Gone, along with the citations to
Frank and G6ring, were references to the unwritten law of the communi-
ty. Scholz continued to base his argument for a general right of expul-
sion on the general clauses and to see those clauses as the basis for
sections of the GmbH Law such as section 34.98 He sought, however, to
add a new perspective to his theory. The relationships between share-
holders were still his primary concern, but they were evaluated in light
of the corporate agreement as manifested by the company charter.
Scholz went back to the revaluation cases of the Weimar era for exam-
ples of the effect of changed circumstances on prior agreements.99 In
doing so, he stressed the fact that the expulsion remedy came from a
line of judicial reasoning thatantedated the Nazi period. Although he
had warmly greeted the 1942 case holding that personal characteristics
such as Jewishness constitute a substantial basis, Scholz rejected such a
treatment of personal characteristics in 1950. His book was published
during a period marked by the "denazification" process. Scholz asserted
that the characteristic of having been an active Nazi should not consti-
tute a substantial basis for purposes of expulsion from the- GmbH. I1°
The debate over whether to continue recognizing an inherent general
right to expulsion from the GmbH was settled by the Supreme Court in
its April 1, 1953 decision, which remains the leading postwar case on
the subject.'0 ' That case involved a GmbH in the process of liquidation.
At a shareholders' meeting, the holders of 30,000 RM worth of shares
expelled the majority shareholder, whose holding was 60,000 RM. The
expelled shareholder complained to the district court, which held in his
favor. In overruling the lower court and reaffirming the general right of
expulsion, the Court considered several possible bases for such a right.
It rejected the idea of expanding the implicit assumptions of section 34
of the GmbH Law.l'2 It also rejected the application by analogy of sec-
tions 737 of the Civil Code and section 140 of the Commercial Code.
The Court pointed out that those sections dealt with. business organiza-
tions other than the GmbH and therefore were not applicable to the
GmbH.
0 3
97. SCHOLZ, supra note 15.
98. Id. at 10-22.
99. Id. at 19-20.
100. Id. at 20.
101. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, BGH, 9 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 157, 157 (F.R.G.).
102. Id. at 161.
103. Id.
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The Court grounded the expulsion right on a deeper level of justice
common to all commercial relationships, as well as to the general claus-
es of wichtige Grund and good faith. These specific provisions, like the
code sections mentioned above, were expressions of the fundamental
assumption of German law that one should not be trapped in an unbear-
able commercial relationship:
The legal grounding for the ability to expel a shareholder from the
GmbH because of a substantial basis is supplied by the principle,
which governs the civil as well as the commercial code, that a
legal relationship heavily impinging on the life activities of a party
can be terminated early if a substantial basis is present."
The Court, however, set two conditions that must be met before the
expulsion remedy could be available in the absence of relevant charter
provisions. First, the action must be confirmed by a court order; it could
not be accomplished by shareholder vote alone. Second, in ordering an
expulsion, the court must also provide a valuation of the expelled share-
holder's equity share. While circumscribing court discretion in this
manner, the Court also provided a vigorous manifesto for judicial activ-
ism:
The law must serve life and must provide the appropriate forms for
its ordering. A judge who is aware of his responsibility cannot
evade the duty, in case of need, to develop the law further. 5
Cases since 1953 have focused on technical questions such as
availability of the remedy in the case of a two-shareholder company and
the specific procedures for effectuating the expulsion remedy in
GmbHs.'°6 Many have dealt with the issue of valuation of the departed
shareholder's holding. Such developments have resulted in the rules and
approaches discussed in the next part of this article.
B. Withdrawal and Expulsion in Contemporary German Practice
1. Withdrawal
The right to withdraw is now generally available to all shareholders
in a GmbH.10 7 The basis for obtaining such relief is the existence of a
104. Id. (translated by author).
105. Id. at 164 (translated by author).
106. See infra part I.B.2.
107. See BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 368-72. See also FISCHER et al., supra
note 25, at 578; Peter Ulmer, in HACHENBURG, supra note 25, § 1, 31; ROTH , supra note
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wichtige Grund [substantial basis]. The wichtige Grund can arise from
three sources. The first source involves the departing shareholder per-
sonally. In this case, there must be a situation that makes remaining in
the company infeasible for the departing shareholder. Such situations
can include extreme financial need, lengthy and expensive illness,
relocation abroad, and inability to perform duties required by the terms
of the shareholding. °8 A second possible source for a wichtige Grund is
the behavior of other shareholders. Arbitrary exercise of majority power
or a permanent dispute with other shareholders can give rise to with-
drawal."0 A third source is the situation of the company. Long-term lack
of return on shareholdings or a change in the purposes of the company
that entails additional risks can suffice."
The broad scope of wichtige Grund shows that neither fault nor
exclusion from decisionmaking is necessary in order to establish a right
of withdrawal. In the absence of relevant provisions in the GmbH Law,
this right has been grounded on the general principle of good faith and
on the "consideration with respect to long-term relationships that an
individual must be able to terminate them when the circumstances on
the basis of which they were entered have permanently and negatively
changed..'' These notions permeate the commercial law of which
corporation law is a part.
The procedure for withdrawal, at the outset, is a matter of internal
company policy. 112 This procedure can be regulated by the company's
articles of association. The articles, however, can only amplify the right
of withdrawal; they cannot restrict or eliminate it." 3 Such a right is a
25, at 582-83; ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 507-508; Winter, supra note 25, § 15;
SCHULZE ZUR WIESCHE, supra note 25, at 56-60; SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 12.
108. See BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 369. See also ROWEDDER et al., supra
note 25, at 508; Winter, supra note 25, § 15, 1119.
109. See ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 508.
110. Id. Note, however, that the substantial basis for expulsion differs from that on
which dissolution is predicated. For expulsion, the substantial basis must lie in the person of
the expelled shareholder. See Judgment of Feb. 23, 1981, BGH, 80 BGHZ 346 (F.R.G.). For
dissolution, the substantial basis must lie in the company rather than a shareholder. If it lies in
a shareholder, then expulsion is available and dissolution will not be granted. id.
11. See ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 503 (translated by author). See also
SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 37-38 (discussing the relationship between good faith and
substantial basis in the parallel expulsion context); Judgment of Apr. 1 1953, BGH, 9
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 157, 157 (F.R.G.) (dealing
with issue prefigured in Judgment of Feb. 7, 1930, RGH 128 RGZ, 1 (Ger.)). '
112. BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 370-71. See also FISCHER et al., supra
note 25, at 293; Ulmer in HACHENBURG, supra note 25, § 9a, 1 17; ROWEDDER et al., supra
note 25, at 509-12; Winter, supra note 25, § 15, 121-29.
113. BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 371. See also FISCHER et al., supra note
25, at 292.
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legally guaranteed aspect of shareholding in the GmbH. Whether or not
the articles have applicable provisions, the departing shareholder first
gives notice to the company of a desire to leave." 4 The other share-
holders then meet to give their consent. The departing shareholder must
be paid the value of his or her share, and payment can be accomplished
in one of several ways." 5 Unless the articles specify a procedure, the
company can retire the share, assign it to a third party, assign it pro rata
to the remaining shareholders, or acquire it in the name of the company.
If none among the company, the remaining shareholders, or third parties
is able to pay the value of the withdrawn share, then the departing
shareholder's recourse would be liquidation of the company." 6
2. Expulsion
The withdrawal remedy is ideally suited to the needs of shareholders
who, for personal reasons, find continued participation in the company
onerous. Such personal concerns can be far removed from the company-
based issues addressed by analogous remedies in U.S. law. When share-
holder dissatisfaction arises from such company-based issues, however,
withdrawal is seen as an incomplete solution in German law. In cases of
deadlock or arbitrary action by majority shareholders, withdrawal gives
dissatisfied shareholders the monetary value of their share, but forces
them to sever their relationship with the company and leave it in the
hands of the remaining shareholders. To fill this gap and address the
problem of dissatisfied shareholders who wish to remain in the compa-
ny, German courts recognize another remedy for dispute resolution in
the GmbH - expulsion (Ausschlujf or Ausschliefung).
Unlike withdrawal, expulsion is not an attempt to effectuate the will
of the departing shareholder. Instead, expulsion represents the extinction
of the expelled shareholder's right to a voice in company affairs, which
is usually considered a fundamental element of shareholding. As we
have seen, expulsion of shareholders against their will has been contro-
versial; the basis that ultimately led to such a remedy was initially
rejected by German courts." 7 During the past half century, however,
expulsion has come to be accepted as a general right of GmbH share-
114. ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 511-12. See also Winter, supra note 25, § 15,
122.
115. ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 514-18; Winter, supra note 25, § 15, T 126
116. ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 514-18.
117. Judgment of Dec. 7, 1920, RGH, 101 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Zivilsachen [RGZ] 55 (Ger.). The Albatros case is the classic expression of the formalistic
rejection of the withdrawal and expulsion remedies in the GmbH context.
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holders." 8 As in withdrawal, it can be authorized by a company's arti-
cles. The articles may not, however, restrict or eliminate the right of
expulsion."19 Regardless of the presence or absence of relevant provi-
sions in the company's articles, German courts have found the following
elements and approaches required as a matter of law.
As in withdrawal, the procedure for expulsion begins within the
company, though the mechanism for effectuating it is ultimately a court
of law. 20 Since the eventual suit is in the name of the company, the
company must decide to expel the shareholder in question by a share-
holders' vote. The general trend among German courts is to require a
supermajority of votes for such a motion to carry.' Some commenta-
tors have argued that the remedy should be available on the basis of a
simple majority vote.' The most striking aspect of this procedure from
the non-German perspective results from the fact that the subject of the
vote may not vote his or her shares. It is therefore entirely possible for
a minority to expel a majority shareholder. 23 Although expulsion is a
decision made in the company's name, the right to determine company
policy inherent in owning a majority share is not upheld in this context.
The leading postwar case on the subject crystallized the German view:
It can therefore happen that a majority shareholder can be
expelled by the court upon the decision of a minority if a substan-
tial basis is present. The view of the complaint that it would be
118. Some commentators have suggested that the expulsion right should only be avail-
able in GmbH's with "personal" rather than "capitalist" structures. The argument has been
widely rejected. See, e.g., BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 362; SOUFLEROS, supra
note 25, at 42-44 (rejecting the limitation of the expulsion remedy to personal companies);
Winter, supra note 25, § 15, 131 (pointing out that personal structure, while not a necessity,
can be one factor among many in evaluating the presence of a substantial basis); Judgment of
Sept. 25, 1985, OLG-Celle, 30 Rechtsprechung der oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen [OLGZ]
462 (F.R.G.) (dealing with fairness of par value compensation but accepting expulsion of
bankrupt AG from GmbH, as provided for in its articles).
119. See BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 362; ROTH, supra note 25, at 583;
ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 504.
120. See BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 364-65; Winter, supra note 25, § 15,
138-46; SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 48-75 (rejecting the idea that shareholders can expel
without a court decision). See also Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, BGH, 9 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 157, 157 (F.R.G.) (rejecting the notion that
shareholders do not need a court order to expel). Scholz had originally argued for the
proposition that a shareholder could be expelled by a shareholders' meeting without a court
order.
121. See BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 364-65; Winter, supra note 25, § 15,
1 140; SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 58-62.
122. See BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 364-65; Winter, supra note 25, § 15,
140; SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 58-62.
123. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, 9 BGHZ at 178.
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grotesque for the minority to be able to expel a shareholder who
holds a majority overlooks the fact that a majority position in the
company is no carte blanche for conduct in violation of company
norms (gesellschaftswidriges Verhalten). 24
The procedure mandated by German law raises serious difficulties in
the common case of the two-shareholder GmbH. Because shareholders
cannot vote on the issue of their own expulsion and because minorities
can expel majorities, stalemates can arise even in the absence of an
equal division of shareholding. In Germany this problem arises in any
two-person company. For many years this issue was avoided because the
validity of a one-person GmbH was not recognized under German law.
Expelling one of two shareholders would have created, even if tempo-
rarily, a one-person GmbH. As long as the validity of such a company
remained an open question, the applicability of the expulsion remedy to
the two-person GmbH was accordingly unclear.
In recent decades, however, German court decisions have recognized
both the validity of the one-person GmbH and the possibility of expel-
ling one of two shareholders in a company.'25 In the presence of an
intra-company dispute, the result can be a race to the courthouse with
parallel actions by each shareholder seeking to expel the other. The
theoretical question of whether such shareholders are acting in the name
of the company remains open. The practical reality is that the court must
disentangle the procedural and substantive issues.
Once the court has decided on the merits, expelled shareholders
must be paid the value of their holding.126 The means by which payment
124. Id.
125. Georg Hohner, in HACHENBURG, supra note 25, § Einl, 31 (Carl H. Barz et al.
eds., 7th ed. 1975); ROTH, supra note 25, at 587; ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 512-13;
SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 73-74. The shareholder seeking expulsion must not, however,
present a wichtige Grund himself or herself. See, e.g., Judgment of Jan. 25, 1960, BGH, 32
BGHZ 17 (F.R.G.) (holding that a two-person company expulsion of one is not fair if both
present wichtige Grund; in the underlying complaint, breach of trust, the general right of
expulsion was upheld); Judgment of Feb. 23, 1981, BGH, 80 BGHZ 346 (F.R.G.) (holding
that expulsion of a shareholder in a two-person GmbH is valid only if remaining shareholder
does not present a wichtige Grund).
126. See BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 365-67; FISCHER et al., supra note 25,
at 292; Hohner, in HACHENBURG, supra note 25, § 33, 2; ROTH, supra note 25, at 588-90;
ROWEDDER et al.,-supra note 25, at 514-18; SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 38-40. The depen-
dence of the expulsion remedy on valuation has been limited in some cases. See, e.g.,
Judgment of Feb. 17, 1955, BGH, 16 BGHZ 317 (F.R.G.) (holding that if the expelled party
does not cooperate in the valuation process, expulsion can proceed independently of compen-
sation); Judgment of June 20, 1983, BGH, 50 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 2880
(validating a provision in the company's articles stating that expelled shareholders were to be
paid market value, and if parties could not agree, an outside accountant would determine it; if
the expelled party was not satisfied with the compensation, an action for damages would be
appropriate, but it would not invalidate expulsion).
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is accomplished resemble those available in withdrawal situations. The
share can be redeemed, acquired by the company, acquired by one or
more remaining shareholders, or acquired by a third party. If there is no
way to effectuate this process and pay the expelled shareholder, the
alternative is dissolution.'27
Regardless of the option chosen, price is the crucial question in
balancing the conflicting interests of the expelled and remaining share-
holders. The leading modem case on expulsion declared the standard to
be the "full worth" of the lost share.128 Unfortunately, "full worth" is a
concept so vague as to provide little guidance. The court has responsi-
bility for determining the full value of the expelled shareholder's share.
The most common standard articulated by commentators is Verkehrswert
[market value]. 129 This value is defined as what a disinterested third
party would pay for the shares. It includes Firmenwert [good will] in
order to realize full value of the shares. If there are outstanding disin-
terested offers, the determining of value is straightforward. In the ab-
sence of such offers, valuation of shares is as problematic as it is in the
United States. First, the company itself must be valued as a whole
before proportional shares in it can be assigned values. The standards
suggested by German commentators focus on going concern valuation.
They usually reject a balance sheet approach and seek to include good
will as part of the capitalized value of Ertragswert [earnings poten-
tial]. 30 The less tangible aspects of value, such as earnings potential,
would involve German courts in a difficult evaluation of company
policies and their future potential. there is anecdotal evidence that at
least some courts do not engage in such financially sophisticated analy-
sis. 13 Rather, legally trained judges unfamiliar with accounting method-
ologies sometimes value companies conservatively without including
such factors as goodwill. These intangible elements of value are some-
127. BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 365-67. See also SOUFLEROS, supra note
25, at 130-212 (containing the most detailed treatment of the mechanisms for paying the
expelled shareholder and valuing his or her share).
128. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, 9 BGHZ at 164, 168.
129. ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 514-16; SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 194-211.
See also GROSSFELD, UNTERNEHMENSBEWERTUNG IN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT'(1983) (dealing
generally with the problem of valuing enterprises).
Courts have also considered the rights and obligations of expelled shareholders. See, e.g.,
Judgment of Oct. 26, 1983, BGH, 88 BGHZ 320 (F.R.G.) (holding that after announcement of
withdrawal, but before compensation is paid, a shareholder has the right to vote on financial
matters personally affecting the shareholder, but is bound by good faith not to obstruct other
matters).
130. ROWEDDER et al., supra'note 25, at 514-16; SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 194-211.
131. Private interviews by the author., of clerks in German court commercial chambers
conducted in March 1991 and September 1993.
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times held to be unsubstantiert [unsubstantiated]. The party claiming
compensation for them can then be found not to have met the necessary
burden of proof.
The basis for obtaining expulsion of a shareholder, like that for
withdrawal, is the existence of a wichtige Grund [substantial basis].
Because expulsion is carried out against the will of the affected share-
holder, the range of circumstances that can constitute a substantial basis
is narrower than it is in the case of withdrawal. In a suit for expulsion,
the substantial basis must lie in the person of the shareholder to be
expelled. Despite this limitation, the variety of actionable bases is wider
than one schooled in the U.S. approach, would expect.
Postwar German courts and commentators have resorted to the
remedy of expulsion in cases involving factors such as advanced age,
extended illness, or mental derangement that make participation in the
affairs of the company infeasible.' In addition to characteristics such as
these, a shareholder's behavior or financial circumstances can also
constitute a wichtige Grund. Examples of these factors include lack of
trustworthiness or creditworthiness, disorganized financial circumstances,
the loss of personal qualifications mandated by the articles, dereliction
of duty, breach of trust, causing incurable dissension among the share-
holders, making improper sexual advances, and the like.'
33
The broad range of these factors is instructive. Some involve mis-
conduct and fault on the part of the expelled shareholder. These cases
are the easiest to justify. Courts and commentators, however, have
consistently held that misbehavior or fault, while constituting a substan-
tial basis, is not a necessary element for expulsion. 34 Many of the
actionable bases listed above involve no notion of fault whatsoever. Old
age, financial difficulties, and the like simply describe situations in
which the continued presence of one 'shareholder is intolerable for the
others. The test, then, focuses on the circumstances of the parties'
relationship in determining the availability of the expulsion remedy.
When they attempt to articulate the standards by which their test is
to be applied, German courts and commentators have generally relied on
vague formulations. The most common is that the presence of the share-
holder in question must be unbearable (unertrdglich or untragbar) to the
132. See BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 362-63; FISCHER et al., supra note 25,
at 290; HACHENBURG, supra note 25, § Einl, T 4; ROTH, supra note 25, at 586-87;
ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 506; Winter, supra note 25, § 15, 133-35; SOUFLEROS,
supra note 25, at 28-33.
133. BAUMBACH & HUECK, supra note 25, at 362-63.
134. Id.
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others. 135 In underscoring the fact that expulsion is a remedy of last
resort, courts usually require that the substantial basis be so severe that
it is impossible for the company to achieve its purposes. Although this
aspect of the test resembles the U.S. practice, the examples of wichtige
Grund listed above clearly demonstrate that the unbearableness standard
embraces a wider range of issues than the concepts of deadlock and
oppression found in U.S. law.' 36
In attempting to flesh out the vague language of the prevailing
German standard, many commentators rely on the GmbH law proposed,
but not adopted, in the 1970s. The proposed law would have codified
the existing judge-made law regarding withdrawal and expulsion. The
traditional GmbH law was retained, however, it contained several key
amendments. Withdrawal and expulsion were left outside the statute,
and they remained matters for judicial development. The language of the
proposed law, however, has played a role in that development. Section
207(1) of the proposal defines wichtige Grund as follows:
A substantial basis (wichtige Grund) is presented in particular
if the shareholder, either through his person! or his behavior, makes
reaching the goals of the company impossible or greatly threatened,
or if, moreover, the person or behavior of the shareholder makes it
evident that his remaining in the company would be unbearable.137
Unfortunately this definition, though widely cited, clarifies the vague
concept of wichtige Grund by reference to the equally vague concept of
unbearability.
As we have seen, the courts were initially reluctant to rely on
wichtige Grund in the GmbH context. Although applied to the GmbH
by later judges, it arises from sections of the German Civil Code
(Burgerliches Gesetzbuch or BGB) dealing with contract-based personal
relationships or obligations. Section 626 of the Civil Code permits
termination of personal service contracts by a party if the facts present a
substantial basis such that continuing the performance cannot be expect-
ed.'38 Section 671 of the Civil Code permits the person owing perfor-
mance under a contract of mandate to terminate the mandate in the
presence of a substantial basis without having to compensate the other
party. 39 Civil Code sections 712 and 723 allow partners to remove those
135. Id. at 363.
136. See infra part II.A.
137. HACHENBURG, supra note 25, at 488.
138. PALANDT, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH §,626 (47th ed. 1988).
139. Id. § 671.
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engaged in management or to terminate their own partnership because of
a substantial basis."40 These four Code sections all involve situations in
which a party is required to continue performance personally over a
period of time. The concept of wichtige Grund expressly permits such
parties to extricate themselves from these obligations without incurring
fault.
With respect to the GmbH, however, there are no such statutory
provisions. Courts must therefore' have a conceptual basis for linking
these doctrines of personal service law to the problems of the GmbH.
Judges have introduced the remedies of withdrawal and expulsion and
the concept of substantial basis on two theoretical grounds: (1) analogy
to other sections of GmbH Law; and (2) derivation from general notions
of good faith that underlie German commercial law.'14
Several provisions of the GmbH Law allow for removal of share-
holders who are in default on obligations required by their shareholder
status. These provisions deal with those who default on payment of the
required amount of investment in the company, 42 those who voluntarily
return shares to the company on which additional calls for investment
have been made, 11 3 those who have assigned their shares, 144 and those
whose shares have been redeemed through amortization. 145 All of these
cases involve situations where the economic basis (what Anglo-Ameri-
can lawyers might call consideration) for maintaining shareholder status
either does not exist or has been transferred. The GmbH Law itself thus
treats continued membership in a company in narrowly financial terms.
Early on, German courts expanded very slightly the scope of application
of these GmbH Law provisions. They were also held to include non-
performance of services required under the terms of shareholding in the
company (Nebenleistungspflichten)
46
In response to the historical development outlined in Part I.A, some
postwar German courts and commentators have argued that a more
general application of the withdrawal and expulsion remedies is a proper
extension of the approach found in the foregoing sections of the GmbH
Law. 14 7 For them, the personal attributes and behavior toward fellow
140. Id. §§ 712, 723.
141. SOUFLEROS,.supra note 25, at 19-24.
142. MUELLER, supra note 21, at 25-27.
143. Id. at 31.
144. Id. at 35-39.
145. Id. at 43.
146. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
147. SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 19-122.
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shareholders bounded by the concepts of substantial basis and
unbearableness also represent commitments to the company that should
constitute de minimis requirements for continued maintenance of share-
holder status. The analogy to these GmbH sections, however, is a tenu-
ous basis for the more general remedies of expulsion and withdrawal.
Some sections, such as section 34,14' require authorization in the articles
of association. More basically, these carefully circumscribed provisions
of the GmbH Law can by their very existence undercut the notion that a
generally available expulsion remedy exists.
Some authors and courts have gone beyond the confines of the
GmbH Law to find a basis for expulsion and withdrawal in general
commercial law. One such approach emphasizes similarities between the
personal relationships characteristic in the GmbH and those found in
other types of associations such as partnerships. Section 737 of the Civil
Code14 9 and section 140 of the Commercial Code (Handels-gesetzbuch
or HGB) provide analogous remedies in such business forms. 5 Under-
lying similarities between distinct legal forms, however, do not indicate
whether analogy is an appropriate or necessary solution. As the Albatros
case stressed, a GmbH is not a partnership, and the GmbH Law does not
provide for such a partnership remedy.'
A more commonly accepted approach does not focus on particular
analogies with technical provisions of statutes. Rather, it looks at the
underlying principles of German commercial law as a whole.'52 The
GmbH is a commercial entity, and its formation involves explicit and
implicit commercial agreements. It is effected by relevant sections of the
Civil and Commercial Codes and by the broad norms that courts have
found to underlie such sections. One such norm is the general principle
that in legal relationships involving ongoing obligations (Dauerschuld-
verhiltnisses), it must be possible for a party to extricate itself when
new circumstances have made continuing the relationahip unac-
ceptable.' With respect to the GmbH, the German Federal High Court
has specifically held that long-term personal relationships can be termi-
148. GmbH Law, supra note 21, § 34.
149. PALANDT, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, supra note 138, § 737.
150. SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 22.
151. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
152. SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at 23-25.
153. See ROWEDDER et al., supra note 25, at 503. See also SOUFLEROS, supra note 25, at
37-38 (discussing the relationship between good faith and substantial basis in the parallel
expulsion context); Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, BGH, 9 Entscheidungen des Bundes-
gerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 157 (F.R.G.) (dealing with the good faith issue prefigured
in Judgment of Feb. 7, 1930, RGH, 128 RGZ I (Ger.).
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nated because of a substantial basis if there is a strong effect on a
shareholder's life activities or if the business relationship involves
reciprocal interlocking of interests and necessitates personal cooperation,
friendly terms, or undisturbed mutual trust between the parties. 54 Al-
though the general availability of expulsion was not accepted then, the
broader relational principle later articulated by the Federal High Court
was noted as early as 1930 by a Supreme Court decision.'55
The principle's development and wider application occurred in
tandem,with the development of the other commonly accepted basis for
the expulsion remedy - the general obligation of Treuepflicht [good
faith]. The central role played by the concept of Treu und Glaube [good
faith] in German commercial law has been noted frequently by outside
observers. 5 6 Its classic formulation is section 242 of the Civil Code,
which states with pregnant simplicity:
242. Performance based on good faith (Treu und Glaube). The
obligator has a duty to effect performance as required by good
faith and with regard to common practice. 57
As we have seen, the devastating hyperinflation of the 1920s disrupted
the German economy and demolished the assumptions on which eco-
nomic actors had based their expectations. Judges used section 242 to
fashion a response to the crisis. The result became an ever-expanding
body of jurisprudence dealing with the content and applicability of the
good faith concept. The doctrine of good faith spread from specific
areas of contract and debtor-creditor law to the entire field of business
and commercial law. Good faith came to embrace related duties of
protection, cooperation, clarification, and notification. It was also related
to the acceptance of the fundamental principle of the Geschafts-
grundlage [basis of the transaction] in German contract and commercial
law.
To the extent that the relational and good faith norms governing
German commercial law as a whole are viewed as the foundation for the
expulsion remedy, they provide further criteria for determining whether
the "unbearability"' 5' perceived by a shareholder merits judicial relief.
The obligation of good faith, expressed in abstract terms, is no clearer
than the notion of unbearability. There is, however, an enormous body
154. See Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, 9 BGHZ at 157.
155. Judgment of Feb. 7, 1930, 128 RGZ at 1.
156. See, e.g., E.J. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 96-101 (2d ed. 1968).
157. PALANDT, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, supra note 138, § 242.
158. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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of case law and practice evaluating standards of good faith. As a
practical matter, therefore, the standard does provide some guidance.
II. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Before engaging in a more explicit comparison of German and U.S.
approaches to close corporation dispute resolution, this section will
summarize briefly the U.S. approaches. In the preceding discussion,
occasional references to the U.S. approach highlighted aspects of Ger-
man practice particularly interesting to U.S. observers. These aspects of
German practice involve the remedies available to aggrieved parties, the
basis on which such remedies are granted, and the scope of judicial
involvement in settling issues between the parties. The following brief
summary will discuss U.S. developments with respect to these same
issues in order to provide a framework for comparison. For details,
readers should consult the notes. After making some general points
about German legal culture, Part II will address several specific ele-
ments of the withdrawal and expulsion doctrines. The Conclusion will
then discuss some broader implications of the historical development of
those doctrines.
A. The U.S. Approach
The traditional U.S. remedy for deadlock or dissension in a closely
held corporation has been dissolution. Personal dislocation and the loss
of going value commonly follow such an event. 9 The threshold for
159. The traditional rule has been that, in the absence of statutory authority, courts
generally lack power to wind up a solvent corporation. See Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that courts have no general power absent statute to
dissolve a corporation and distribute its assets). Therefore, more and more states have enacted
statutes expressly granting courts involuntary dissolution power. A typical statute is modeled
after the Model Business Code. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 14.30 (Am. Bar Ass'n
1993). See generally J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation:
A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV.
1, 26-30 (1977). Bases for involuntary dissolution under such statutes include: (1) Director
deadlock and irreparable injury (see, e.g., wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1430(2)(a) (West 1992));
(2) Illegal, oppressive or fraudulent acts by directors or those in control of the corporation
(see, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 12.50 (1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a.
(McKinney 1986)); (3) Shareholder deadlock leading to inability to elect directors for a
specified period (see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(a) (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1104(a)(2) (McKinney 1986) (having no specified time period));
(4) Misapplication or waste of corporate assets (see, e.g., Johnston v. Livingston Nursing
Home, Inc., 211 So. 2d 151 (Ala. 1968); F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.26 (3d ed. 1992)).
On the remedy, see generally In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y.
1954) (affirming dismissal of petition for involuntary dissolution divided between two hostile
shareholders because there was no stalemate regarding corporate policies, and the corporation
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obtaining such relief was generally high - economic inviability of the
enterprise.' 6° This criterion, however, was not necessarily linked to the
issues causing dissension between the parties. It is perfectly possible for
a company to be profitable even though the shareholders find each
others' presence intolerable. As in Germany, the mechanism for effectu-
ating this drastic solution was the court system. Judges were called upon
to evaluate the viability of the enterprise in question rather than the
merits of the underlying grievances between the shareholders.
The three elements of the traditional approach - remedy, basis, and
mechanism - -were inextricably linked. They reflected a consistent,
somewhat formalistic view. Judges' lack of business expertise and their
consequent reticence to address issues of business management rein-
forced the need for a high threshold of court action. In addition, this
threshold was defined in terms of "objective" indicia of economic
viability. 161 Courts thus, avoided the difficult task of analyzing the
was flourishing). Hetherington and Dooley compiled data regarding dissolution proceedings
and found that dissolution has no significant impact upon whether the business will survive or
die because in a majority of cases, one party eventually bought the other party out. This led
to their suggestion to establish a statutory buyout scheme. Hetherington & Dooley, supra.
160. Courts view dissolution as a drastic remedy of last resort. Hockenberger v. Curry,
215 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Neb. 1974) (quoting Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp, 184 N.E.2d
792, 795 (I11. Ct. App. (1962)). See also Stott Realty Co. v. Orlaff, 247 N.W. 698, 699 (Mich.
1933) (allowing dissolution only where, with any other remedy, corporation cannot be made
to function for the purpose of its creation); Johnston v. Livingston Nursing Home, Inc., 211
So. 2d 151, 155 (Ala. 1968) (holding that in a dissolution proceeding, the party must show
injury and, in this case, the corporation operated at a substantial profit; therefore dissolution
was denied).
For further statutory interpretations reflecting the drastic nature of problems required to
effect dissolution, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(2)(i) (1990) (granting dissolution in a
deadlock only when business can no longer be conducted to the advantage of all the share-
holders); Paulman v. Kritzer Radiant Coils, Inc., 143 A.2d 272 (Del. 1958) (interpreting DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(1), (2) (1991) and stating that with respect to electing directors,
there must be more than a showing of shareholder deadlock); In re Lakeland Development
Corp., 152 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. 1967) (interpreting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.49(4)
(repealed and superseded by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.752 (West Supp. 1993)) and stating
that a party must show irreconcilable deadlock and prove that the business cannot be conduct-
ed to the advantage of the shareholders); Lush'us Brand Distrib., Inc. v. Fort Dearborn
Lithograph Co., 70 N.E.2d 737, 741 (II1. Ct. App. 1941) (refusing to grant dissolution and
requiring "irreparable injury"); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 14.30(2)(ii) (Am. Bar Ass'n
1993) (with respect to director deadlock, there must be irreparable injury or it must be shown
that the business can no longer be conducted to the advantage of shareholders generally). For
an example of state statutes that track the Model Business Code and require irreparable injury,
see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1430(2)(c) (West 1992). Note, however, that some statutes, much
like the Model Business Code, do not require irreparable injury where there is shareholder
deadlock regarding the election of directors for a certain period of time. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A: 12-7(1)(a) (West Supp. 1993). See also In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d 563,
569 (N.Y. 1954); Wollam v. Littman, 316 N.Y.S.2d 526, 527 (1970) (holding that irreconcil-
able differences do not mandate dissolution).
161. See Johnston v. Livingston Nursing Home, Inc., 211 So. 2d at 154-55 (denying
petition for dissolution because business was profitable and objective indicia of viability were
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subjective attitudes of the shareholders toward each other and the merits
of their business disputes. The dissolution remedy addressed the corpo-
ration as an independent judicial person. When dissolution was granted,
by severing all parties' ties to the company, the court avoided the neces-
sity for apportioning responsibility or allocating remedies among them.
Thus, at the threshold and final stages, judicial efforts at dispute resolu-
tion avoided dealing with concrete relationships, between the parties.' 62
The traditional approach's advantages to the judicial system were
obtained at the cost of possible injustice to aggrieved shareholders. If
successful in their suits for dissolution, shareholders nevertheless sus-
tained losses in the psychic and material value of their stake in the
defunct corporation.163 In recent decades,. U.S. courts and legislators
have responded to this problem in a variety of ways. Each of the three
elements of the older solution has given rise to new developments.
The dissolution remedy was widely perceived as leading to a loss of
what economists call "going concern value."' 64 As between the parties,
the liquidation that often follows dissolution may not yield proceeds that
satisfied); Firebaugh v. McGovern, 88 N.E.2d 473, 476 (III. 1949) (regarding economic
viability, it was "[i]mpossible for the corporation to carry on its business or preserve its
assets"); Hammond v. Hammond, 216 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1948) (allowing dissolution
only if it appears that "the dissensions are of such a nature as to imperil the business");
Bartlett v. Caines, 363 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (pointing to the solvency
and viability of the company as evidence of the lack of deadlock and thus refusing to order
dissolution). See also In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d at 564 (denying dissolution
partially because corporation was operating profitably).
162. See In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d at 564 (recognizing that the business
was successful and denying dissolution regardless of the fact that the two shareholders
despised each other); Johnston v. Livingston Nursing Home, Inc., 211 So. 2d at 154 (denying
dissolution because corporation operating at a profit, and the court did not want to get
involved with internal dissension); Smith-Schrader Co. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283, 291 (III. Ct.
App. 1985) (denying dissolution because the inability of two shareholders to get along did not
constitute economic inviability of the corporation). But see Martin v. Martin's News Services,
Inc., 518 A.2d 951, 956 (Conn. Ct. App. 1986). Martin interpreted a Connecticut statute
allowing dissolution for any good and sufficient reason as permitting courts to analyze the
management issues involved. In Martin, the court granted relief because there was no input
for a 50% shareholder.
163. See Moore v. Carney, 269 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (refusing to order
dissolution because remedy was seen as too harsh and the court was concerned about the loss
of material value in the corporation); In re Radom'& Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d at 568
(denying dissolution because allowing it would not be beneficial to one of the shareholders);
Banker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973) (granting forced buyout
in lieu of statutory dissolution, because dissolution was too drastic and harsh of a remedy and
would cause loss of material value); Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., .409 P.2d 813
(Mont. 1966) (refusing to grant dissolution because it was not in the best interest of share-
holders and using instead a receiver to replace the board of directors.).
164. See Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 348 P.2d 9, 22 (Or. 1959); In re Radom &
Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d at 568 (denying petition for dissolution because of the possible
injustice for one shareholder - a loss of going concern value in this case). But see Lebold v.
Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1942) (disputing the amount of the going value lost).
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reflect the full value of the enterprise. Judicial and legislative responses
fall broadly into two categories. The first turns the matter over to neutral
third parties for resolution. The second leads to various mechanisms for
a buyout by one party of the other's interest.
The first approach has been reliance on third-party arbitration.
Traditionally, courts were quite skeptical about arbitration in an intra-
corporate context. There was concern that agreement to turn
decisionmaking over to outside arbitrators divested the board of direc-
tors of its statutory obligations to manage the affairs of the corpora-
tion. 165 More generally, there was also some hesitation by common law
courts to turn legal dispute resolution over to other fora.' 66 In recent
decades, however, both concerns have receded and arbitration is an
increasingly popular solution.
Legislators have taken a somewhat analogous approach. Many state
corporation codes provide for court appointment of a provisional direc-
tor, or a custodian. 67 As in the case of arbitration, provisional directors
enable the corporation to survive and provide a means for breaking
165. See Application of Vogel, 268 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div. 1966), aff'd, 224 N.E.2d
738 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that resolving dispute by an arbitral panel does not run afoul of a
statute requiring that a business be managed by its board of directors). See also G. Richard
Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N. CAR. L. REV. 517, 528 (1989); Note,
Arbitration as a Means of Settling Disputes Within Close Corporations, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
267, 286-88 (1963); Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate
Disputes, 56 VA. L. REv. 271 (1970).
166. See G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N. CAR. L. REV.
517 (1989). See, e.g., Parks v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 177 N.E. 28, 83 (Ohio 1931) (citing
constitutional language that courts are open to every person who deserves a remedy by due
course of law); Note, Arbitration as a Means of Settling Disputes Within Close Corporations,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 286-88 (1963); Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-
Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA. L. REV. 271 (1970); O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note
159, § 9.14.
In many states, the legislature has specifically provided for appointment of a provisional
director to serve as an outside neutral party to resolve the dispute and deadlock situation. This
is very much like using arbitration as a dispute resolution technique. These statutes generally
provide the provisional director with the rights and powers of other directors. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:12-7(3) (West Supp: 1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 12.55 (1989); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1802 (West 1990) (provisional director appointed by the court and has the
rights and powers of a regular director until the deadlock is broken or the provisional director
is removed by the court or shareholders). One California case has even held that the sole
purpose of the director is to vote with one side and form a majority to resolve the dispute.
Latt v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 296, 212 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1985). For examples of
provisional director appointment in close corporation statutes, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 353 (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.995(19)(b)(7) (West 1992).
167. Provision of a custodian resembles the appointment of a provisional director except
that the custodian replaces the entire board of directors and runs the corporation on the
grounds that the board is incapable of functioning. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352 (1991);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 12.60(h) (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(4) (West Supp.
1993). For an example of close corporation statutes, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833 (West
1992).
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deadlocks. Unlike arbitration, the statutory solution is not dependent
upon agreement between the parties. It thus affords a measure of pro-
tection to parties with weak bargaining power.
Despite obvious benefits to the approaches, reliance on arbitration
and provisional directors has serious drawbacks. An important concern
of any party in. a closely held corporation is the opportunity to have a
meaningful voice in the operation of the business. Both third-party
approaches- divest, either temporarily or for a longer term, all parties to
the corporation of effective control. While the corporation's existence is
preserved, it is not always clear that the parties' desires are being ful-
filled. Moreover, the efficacy of third-party dispute resolution is cir-
cumscribed by the nature of the dispute. A one-issue deadlock in the
context of an otherwise satisfactory relationship between the parties is
the most amenable to such a solution. More bitter and protracted dis-
putes require ongoing third-party involvement and are less appropriate.
The limitations of the third-party approach have encouraged the
spread of the second most common solution - the party buyout. A
leading 1977 article demonstrated that, notwithstanding the law's focus
on dissolution, corporate practice often led to private settlement in the
form of purchase by a party or parties of the other's interest in the
company.'6 Such a solution avoided the loss of control inherent in
third-party approaches and made it more likely that the going concern
value would be reflected accurately in the purchase price. The past
decade has seen the incorporation of this widespread practice into a
formal legal framework.' 69 In some cases the buyout remedy is available
only in the context of a suit for involuntary dissolution, but its use has
spread to a broader range of contexts.
70
168. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 159, at 1; Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effective-
ness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35
CLEV. ST. L. REv.' 25 (1986-87) (updating Hetherington & Dooley).
169. In general, the legal framework for buyouts is encompassed in state statutes. In
some instances the buyout right exists only where there is a formal petition for dissolution
with the court. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-
7(8) (West Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2)(a)(9) (West 1992) (concerning only
close corporations); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney 1986) (concerning
only close corporations).
170. In some states, the legislature has enacted statutes which allow the court flexibility
in fashioning a remedy for dissension and deadlock which may include a buyout order. See,
e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985) (allowing "[alny equitable relief"); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 32, para. 12.55 (a)(3) (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31 (1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.751 (West Supp. 1993).
In addition, some courts have allowed a buyout in the absence of any specific statutory
authority, citing their inherent 'equitable powers to fashion any remedy. See, e.g., Baker v.
Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395-97 (Or. 1973) (stating alternatives to
dissolution and ordering buyout as an appropriate relief); Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230,
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As in the case of third-party resolution, the enterprise is preserved
during buyout, and the disruptions associated with dissolution are avoid-
ed. The interaction of economic factors relevant to a buyout shifts the
focus of dispute resolution to the question of price. To the extent that
the determination of purchase price is left to bargaining or bidding by
the parties, their respective financial positions remain key factors. Many
courts and statutory regimes have sought to introduce a more objective
element into the process either by determining the applicable standards
or by involving the court in deciding the company's value.'
7'
The standards generally employed by courts, however, give little
guidance. The application of terms such as "going concern value" or
"investment value" is controversial among accountants and econo-
mists.'72 Behind such expressions lie a variety of applicable factors.
Some courts respond by turning the matter over to outside appraisers,
which requires an additional proceeding and attendant costs for the
parties. 17  Other courts take upon themselves the responsibility for
determining value but must often rely on expert testimony.'
74
236 (Mont. 1983) (holding that liquidation and dissolution are not justified by the equities and
stating that courts can adopt flexible approaches); Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska
1985) (citing Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 275 (Alaska 1980), which noted the
remedial nature of the involuntary dissolution statute, and permitting court to order buyout as
an appropriate equitable remedy). See also Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. App.
1988) (holding that a Texas court, under general equity power, may decree "buyout" in an
appropriate case where less harsh remedies are inadequate of fully protecting the rights of the
parties).
171. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2)(b) (West 1992) (directing a court to set a
fair value based on "going concern value" as determined by evidence, experts, etc.); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(2) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that the "fair value" of shares is to be
measured as of the date of commencement of the action or by another date found equitable by
the court and referring to appraisal statute MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.473(5)(a)); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:12-7(8)(c) (West Supp. 1993) (referral to appraisal statute N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14A:11-8-11 to 14A:II-Il (West Supp. 1993)); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1990)
(stating that the fair value in dissolution proceedings is determined by liquidation value but
that the court may take into account the sale of business as a going concern allowing for the
appointment of 3 disinterested appraisers with the value of the holding determined by a
majority vote of appraisers). For cases interpreting the California statute, see Abrams v.
Abrams-Rubaloff & Associates, 114 Cal. App. 3d 248, 170 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1980); Brown v.
Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1979).
172. See Harry J. Haynsworth, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REv. 457
(1982) (listing various ways to value and specific problems of valuation).
173. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1990) (allowing appointment of outside
appraisers); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-
384(b) (1983).
174. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney 1986). For cases discussing
this provision, see Mitchell v. A.J. Medical Supply, Inc., 529 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1988) (holding
that a private referee is not necessary to determine value in the absence of complex issues);
Petition of Levitt, 492 A.D.2d 502, 492 N.Y.S.2d 736, 739-40 (1985) (discussing the
determination of fair value).
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In view of the strengths and weaknesses inherent in all approaches
to dispute resolution, a recent U.S. trend has been to expand the scope
of judicial discretion. Some courts are authorized to fashion whatever
remedy they deem appropriate under the circumstances.' 7 The best
features of different approaches can thus be combined. This solution
extends the general movement toward greater flexibility and addresses
the gap between the paucity of remedies and the variety of disputes. The
lack of clear standards and the open-ended grant of authority to the
court, however, raise other fundamental concerns. U.S. judges have
traditionally been reluctant to become involved in disputes over "busi-
ness" rather than legal issues. Granting a virtual carte blanche to courts
shifts concern to the question of whether judges are appropriate mecha-
nisms for resolving these disputes.
176
The increasing variety of remedies and of mechanisms for effectuat-
ing them has also led to an expansion of the third element of the tradi-
tional approach, the basis for obtaining relief In the past, concern
focused on the ability of a corporation to make the decisions necessary
to continue functioning. The notion of deadlock was conceived in terms
of mechanisms of corporate governance. 177 The standard for relief was
economic unviability of the enterprise. 178 By its nature, this approach
was most appropriate for disputing parties whose shareholding or
directorial representation was evenly matched. In these cases decisions
could not be made and the corporation -could not function effectively.
Newer legal developments have extended relief to cases of "oppression"
as well as deadlock. Here the majority's voting power enables the
corporation to function, but the exercise of that power is detrimental to
the interests of the minority shareholder. Since the corporation as a
separate entity remains viable and makes decisions, the focus of concern
175. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1804 (West
1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2)(a) (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751
(West Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310 (Law Co-op. 1990)..
Even in the absence of statutes allowing for increased judicial discretion to fashion
flexible remedies, courts have expanded their roles: Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269,
274-75 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
Baker v. Commercial Body Building, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395-96 (1973).
176. See Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987) (using former S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-21-155 (Law Co-op 1987), now S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310 (Law Co-op. 1990)
to fashion a remedy deemed equitable by the court).
177. For director deadlock situations, see, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 14.30(2)(i) (Am. Bar Ass'n 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(1)(b)(1) (West Supp.
1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104 (McKinney 1986).
178. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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shifts to the relationship between the shareholders and the obligations
that arise from that relationship.
The most common test for. oppression used by courts and legisla-
tures has been whether the minority was excluded from having a "mean-
ingful voice" in company affairs.179 This approach to oppression has the
advantage of providing courts with somewhat clearer guidelines. It does
not, however, extend to the full range of personal concerns that could
make a shareholder's relationship to his or her fellows intolerable. In
addressing this range of concerns, a legal system must grapple with
intangible aspects of relationships that are often experienced on an
intensely personal level. Such aspects can only be characterized on a
general level by resorting to vague notions such as fairness. The more
flexible approaches taken by U.S. courts in recent years have moved in
the direction of recognizing the personal aspects of shareholding, though
oppression remains the more common formulation of the basis for relief.
B. Contemporary Approaches Compared
German courts have developed an approach to close corporation
dispute resolution that is fundamentally different from the U.S. concept.
In dealing with extreme cases, they have placed a broad range of per-
sonal factors faced by aggrieved shareholders at the center of judicial
concern. Despite the divergence between the approaches of the U.S. and
German systems, specific elements of both systems often perform
similar functions.
1. Similarity of Statutory Approaches
One key element is the similarity of both countries' statutory provi-
sions. The German GmbH Law was promulgated at the end of the
179. For illegality, fraud, and oppression cases, see Central Standard Life Insurance Co.
v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45 (III. 1957) (holding that oppression by majority is an important
consideration, and first case discussing oppression as a basis for liquidation); Compton v. Paul
K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Ill. Ct. App. 1972) (viewing conduct which is
arbitrary, overbearing, and heavy-handed as depriving those not in control of a meaningful
voice in corporate affairs and, therefore, as oppressive). See also Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugat-
ed Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (III. 1960) (holding that the exclusion of an equal share-
holder from meaningful participation may be oppression); White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315,
319 (Va. 1972) (holding that oppressive conduct does not require fraud or illegality).
For cases demonstrating a trend in looking at reasonable expectations in order to
determine whether oppression has occurred, see In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d
1173, 1179 (focusing on "[clonduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable expectation' held
by minority shareholders 'in committing their capital to the particular enterprise.") In re
Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (defining oppressive conduct in terms of
reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.751(3)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (codifying the reasonable expectation language).
[Vol. 15:127
Withdrawal and Expulsion in Germany
nineteenth century.180 U.S. states were enacting or revising their modem
general corporation statutes at the same time. Both legal regimes paid
deference to the independent legal personality of corporations and to the
processes of shareholder decisionmaking within them. Additionally, both
regimes set a high threshold for judicial intervention and provided
dissolution as the only remedy. These statutory provisions, however,
differed in the degree of their congruence with other key elements of the
respective legal cultures in which they operated.
In the United States, such an approach was consistent with judicial
reluctance to intervene in company management and mirrored U.S.
law's treatment of related fields such as contracts. Traditional U.S. law
emphasizes the importance of participation in corporate decisionmaking
as an inherent element of the property right shareholders hold in their
companies.' 8' If a company's "will" could not be expressed because of a
breakdown in decisionmaking, courts did not attempt to substitute other
principles for it; their alternative was to order dissolution. Although use
of the "nexus of contracts" metaphor for describing the nature of the
corporation is recent, this traditional reliance on dissolution was consis-
tent from the beginning with the perspective of U.S. contract law. In the
field of contracts, certain events can make continued performance diffi-
cult for one or more parties. To the extent that such difficulty constitutes
impossibility, frustration, or impracticability, U.S. courts will release
parties from their contract. 82 The high threshold of judicial intervention
and the remedy of dissolving the parties' relationship are similar in both
fields. As remedies become more flexible and the threshold becomes
lower, newer approaches to close corporation dispute resolution become
less congruent with contract law.
In the context of German commercial law, the dissolution provisions
of the GmbH statute are more anomalous. From the beginning, German
courts have viewed participation in intra-corporate decisionmaking more
broadly than merely in terms of shareholders' property interest in their
voice in the company. The matter is most clearly demonstrated with
respect to the AG. Although the statutes emphasize the role of share-
holder voting, there are mechanisms to include employees, creditors, and
180. See supra note 20.
181. In the famous case of Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 78 N.E. 1090 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1906), the court established stockholder preemptive rights (in the absence of statutory
provisions) in the inherent property right of original shareholders to proportional voting
power.
182. See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTs 700-37 (2d ed. 1990); JOHN E.
MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 633-62 (3d ed. 1990).
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other community interest. groups in the decision-making process.'83
Legal institutions such as AG bearer shares and supervisory boards
permit stakeholders and other groups affected by a company's activities
to have a voice in its internal decisionmaking. This view of the role of
shareholder voting in corporate decisionmaking also influences the
GmbH, as evidenced by the application of co-determination laws to
some GmbH.184 German discourse on corporate law has been influenced
by a strain of thought that emphasizes the social community created by
the ongoing relationships between and activities among those whose
lives are encompassed by a corporation.8 5 We have seen the influence
of such rhetoric in the normative rationales for withdrawal and expul-
sion. Nonetheless, this social community approach has not occupied the
field entirely. Its implications were controversial, and the dissolution
procedures of the GmbH Law itself do not reflect it. Furthermore, early
court decisions rejected such arguments on grounds reminiscent of older
U.S. doctrines. 86 One approach presented a vision of the company as a
contractually based legal arrangement between individuals. The other
saw the company as a community whose binding norms reflected a
reality that was more than just an aggregate of the individuals in the
group. The tension between these differing German approaches played
an important role in the development of GmbH remedies discussed
above.
In the field of contracts, twentieth century German law evolved a
much more interventionist approach to the problems of frustration of
purpose and changed circumstances than did its U.S. counterpart.
87
Rather than extinguishing such contractual relationships, German courts
often reformed the terms of contracts to promote fairness while allowing
the economic benefits of contracts to remain. The basis for judicial
action was the general concept of good faith. German courts thus en-
gaged on a regular basis in evaluating and balancing the kind of busi-
ness issues that U.S. courts traditionally avoided. The resulting gap
between the original approach reflected in the GmbH statute and these
aspects of modem German legal culture gave rise to the judicial law-
making discussed in this article. As a result of such efforts, the German
183. Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the
German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 64-87 (1966).
184. On the codetermination system, see, generally 2 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN
GERMANY 31:1-31:147 (Bernd Raster ed., 1993); HANS NUTZINGER & JORGEN BACKHAUS,
CODETERMINATION: A DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES (1989).
185. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
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approach to GmbH dispute resolution became more similar to the gener-
al approach of German contract and commercial law.
2. Judicial Lawmaking
GmbH dispute resolution clearly demonstrates the important role
judicial creativity plays in German law. When broad comparisons are
made between the civil law and common law systems, one frequent
generalization focuses on the alleged non-reliance by civil law systems
on caselaw precedents.' *Such non-reliance is certainly an important
element of the theoretical underpinnings of the civil law. It is also part
of what Merryman has called the "folklore" of the civil law tradition. 8 9
Merryman, David, Dawson, and others have demonstrated that this
generalization is somewhat misleading-with respect to the actual practice
and evolution of the civil law.19' The area of torts in French and Swiss
law and product liability in German law are well known examples of
elaborate caselaw doctrines founded on slender code provisions.' 9' Such
legal evolution saw the extension of applicable code provisions to new
fact situations. Within limits, the process of judicial gap-filling is part of
the civil law "folklore." A remarkable aspect of German caselaw
developments in GmbH dispute resolution is that they have been created
out of whole cloth by judges. In fact, no German codes or statutes
provide for any of the specific solutions discussed in Part I.B of this
article. Thus the ability of German judges to fashion these solutions
highlights the integrated nature of the German legal system. The doc-
trinal bases for decisions of German courts came not from the GmbH
Law itself, but rather from broad overarching principles that were seen
as immanent in commercial and business law as a whole. The manifes-
tation of these overarching principles was seen at work in the fields of
contract and of personal service obligations. Although these develop-
ments were controversial in Germany, they have nevertheless become an
accepted element of GmbH law.
3. Withdrawal, Expulsion, and Buyout Remedies
The German solution of withdrawal is closest to modem U.S. devel-
opments. As we have seen, many technical issues of the withdrawal and
188. But see REN9 DAVID, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD TODAY 133-37
(1985).
189. JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 21-25, 39-47, 142-58 (2d ed.
1985).
190. Id.; see also DAVID, supra note 188, at 133-37..
191. See, e.g., VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 48, at 590-780.
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expulsion remedies are essentially the same, such as the threshold for
availability of the remedy, the procedure for carrying out the remedy,
and the requirement for share valuation. To this extent, much of the
following discussion of withdrawal also holds true for expulsion.
When considering the operation of these legal doctrines of with-
drawal and expulsion, one must remember that they are not commonly
litigated; shareholders often settle their differences prior, to litigation.
Reported cases tend to represent extreme situations. By their own terms,
these remedies are a last resort. Nevertheless, these doctrines remain
important to the dispute resolution process; they constitute default rules
that the parties will face if they cannot settle. The doctrines thus skew
the relative incentives of the parties and determine the downside risk
incurred by certain patterns of 'shareholder behavior. The following
discussion should be read in the light of this practical reality.
The U.S. remedy most analogous to the right of withdrawal is the
buyout, which has become increasingly popular in recent years. Both the
U.S. buyout and the German withdrawal remedies address the illiquidity
of minority interests in closely held companies. Each of them seeks to
allow the aggrieved shareholder to withdraw without facing a loss while
at the same time permitting the company to continue its existence.
Therefore, on this level of generality, the diagnosis of the problem, the
cure, and the critique of the disruptions caused by resort to dissolution
are the same in both countries. On a more detailed level of analysis,
however, significant differences emerge.
One important issue in the analysis is the nature of the problem that
the remedy addresses. Often, the right to a buyout is triggered only
within the context of a pre-existing suit for dissolution. The problem
then becomes avoiding the default rule of dissolution. Frequently, once
the buyout process is initiated, each party must account for the possibili-
ty of having to buy the other party's share if its own offer to sell is
rejected. Both the context and the mechanism can thus skew the practi-
cal situation facing an aggrieved party.
The default rule of dissolution may also affect the parties differen-
tially. Their financial resources, their degree of personal attachment to
the company, and their range of options for alternative livelihood may
differ considerably. In a situation where one party feels continued
membership in the corporation to be, in the words of German law,
"unbearable," the feeling of compulsion may lead him or her to accept a
price for his or her share below a fair market value (assuming a market
among third parties).
Of course, the notion of market value depends entirely upon the
market one has in mind. The buyout remedy can, in effect, create a
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market restricted to existing shareholders, and the price at which the
shares are sold by definition is a market price from that perspective. The
elegance of ,this solution is that it enables the parties to translate many
intangible aspects of their relationship into a price. From the perspective
of the legal system, it may be efficient to place the responsibility to
value their respective feelings of aggrievement on the parties. Such a
price also reflects, however, the external circumstances mentioned
above, which are not related to the merits of the parties' dispute. Exter-
nal economic circumstances also influence. the decisions as to which
party remains in the company and which party leaves. If one is con-
cerned with achieving justice between the parties in terms of the merits
of their dispute, the result remains unsatisfying. Since the merits of such
business disputes are precisely the kind of issue that U.S. courts general-
ly avoid as a matter of policy, this concern is less -problematic in the
U.S. context.
4. Bases forRelief
From the German perspective, once an aggrieved party makes the
choice either to seek withdrawal and leave the company or to seek
expulsion and remain in the company, the merits of the dispute between
the. parties are the focus of the court's concern. Unlike the U.S. ap-
proach which emphasizes the economic viability of the corporation and
the parties' right to a voice in its affairs, the German approach concen-
trates on the underlying relationship between the parties. The success or
breakdown of this relationship is what gives rise to the overarching
norms of the general clauses. As we have seen, the doctrines from
which the remedy is derived are wichtige Grund [substantial basis] and
good faith.'92 The result in Germany is generally that the question of
which party remains in the company is separated from the external
economic factors that otherwise influence price in the U.S. buyout
context. Once the proceeding begins, the focus of analysis is on whether
a substantial basis for the remedy exists. As described, the range of
potential substantial bases includes the notions of economic inviability
and shareholder oppression familiar to U.S. observers. We have also
seen, however, that the substantial basis can extend to a wide range of
personal and even emotional factors that affect the quality of a share-
holder's experience in the company.
The breadth of the German wichtige Grund concept contrasts with
the somewhat narrower ground for U.S. remedies that are analogous to
192. See supra part I.A.
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withdrawal and expulsion. In the United States, a common basis for the
newer forms of relief is "oppression."' 93 Oppression, in turn, usually
means the exclusion from a meaningful voice in company affairs. 4
Once again, the implicit assumption of the law is that the legal entity's
internal decision-making process is a sine qua non of the rights inherent
in shareholding itself. The deprivation of a shareholder's property right
in having a voice in company affairs is a primary concern of U.S.
courts.
In Germany, oppression can constitute a wichtige Grund, but it is
only one of many possible grounds. The duty of good faith that con-
cerns German courts arises from the underlying relationship of the
parties and is superior to the decision-making structure established by
the company's charter.' 95 German courts therefore have much greater
flexibility in trying to achieve fairness between parties. The disadvan-
tage, however, is that the courts are forced to evaluate precisely the
difficult factual issues of business affairs and relationships that U.S.
courts historically were loath to address.
Another threshold issue is the universality of access to the U.S.
buyout and German withdrawal remedies. This issue is treated differ-
ently in different U.S. jurisdictions. Due to the lack of a consistent
doctrinal basis for the buyout remedy, in some jurisdictions the law
defers to agreement between the parties. In others, the buyout option is
provided by law. In some cases, a buyout remedy requires a pre-existing
suit for dissolution. In Germany, the law holds clearly that all sharehold-
ers in a GmbH have access to the withdrawal and expulsion remedies as
an inherent and inalienable right of shareholding. This doctrine govern-
ing access to the remedies of withdrawal and expulsion is a logical
consequence of the remedies' grounding in the nature of the relationship
between all GmbH shareholders. Furthermore, this general right cannot
be limited by company charters. The universal availability of the Ger-
man remedies yields certain potential advantages. For example, a com-
mon drawback of holding a minority interest in a closely held corpora-
tion is the difficulty one faces in selling such an interest. If parties know
in advance that, regardless of shifting control in the company or amend-
ments to the company's charter, they will always be guaranteed the right
to extricate themselves with their assets intact if there is a substantial
basis, the downside risk of shareholding is lessened to some extent. The
ongoing availability of the withdrawal remedy during the life of a
193. See supra text accompanying note 179.
194. See supra note 179.
195. See supra text accompanying note 124.
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company could also restrain unacceptable behavior by members of the
company, regardless of whether they are majority or minority sharehold-
ers.
• U.S. law constrains majority shareholders through the fiduciary
obligation not to oppress the minority. As we have seen, this U.S.
concept of oppression is often defined narrowly in terms of exclusion
from a meaningful voice in the company. The broader and more vaguely
worded duty of good faith imposed on both majority and minority
GmbH shareholders presents them with a much broader risk in that if
they put the other party in an impossible position, that party may leave
or even that the shareholder himself or herself, may be expelled. To the
extent that courts value companies conservatively, without fully com-
pensating expelled shareholders for intangible assets, this risk can pro-
vide a real incentive to moderating shareholder behavior.
5. Importance of Valuation Mechanisms
The legal systems of both Germany and the United States seek to
safeguard the value of a departing shareholder's interest. In both sys-
tems, therefore, dispute resolution often revolves around the problem of
valuation. In theory, the approaches of both systems are quite similar.
Each of these systems emphasizes the importance of a market value that
incorporates going concern value. The valuation approaches differ
primarily in the mechanisms on which they rely to yield a result. No-
tions of market value are notoriously fluid, and both systems, in theory,
confront this difficulty in attempting to achieve fairness.
In the United States, many approaches to the problem of valuation
have been suggested and implemented. As previously seen, reliance on
a bidding process pursuant to a buyout creates a market between the
parties which handles the valuation problem. Another common approach
is to rely on third-party experts who determine share value in a more
"objective" manner.9 6 These third parties are sometimes arbitrators to
whom the parties turn and sometimes accountants or other experts
appointed by the court.'97 In other cases, judges attempt to deal with the
issue of valuation themselves.' In such situations, however, courts rely
on expert testimony. 99
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
Fall 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
All of these approaches inevitably have strengths and weaknesses.
We have already discussed the process of buyouts and bidding.200 Reli-
ance on third-party experts has the advantage of a more objective analy-
sis that is not skewed by the personal situations of the parties. The
problem, however, is that the concepts and categories underlying the
experts' valuation are capable of varying interpretation. Thus, to the
extent the experts' decisions are not appealable, parties may have cause
for grievance. Courts have the advantage that their decisionmaking is
subject to a higher degree of procedural constraint. Unfortunately, a
court's expertise does not extend to corporate finance, and a court is not
equipped to be an ideal decisionmaker on the subject of valuation. 20' In
relying on expert witnesses, the end result is similar to reliance on
outside parties, except that the ability to rebut expert testimony may
give parties greater input into the valuation process.
The German pattern with respect to valuation as expressed in legal
doctrine and in the work of commentators is clearer. German courts are
charged with responsibility for. valuation as an integral part of their
decisionmaking. One must remember, however, that comparing German
courts with their U.S. counterparts can be misleading. In theory, German
parties to commercial law cases have the possibility of facing a judicial
panel some of whose members are lay judges drawn from a panel of
business experts.2 2 Under the system envisioned in the statute, the
expertise needed for valuation analysis is brought into the judicial
process itself. There would, therefore, be less need for arbitrators or
outside expert opinion. In practice, however, the potential advantages of
this approach are not always realized. The option of waiving the partic-
ipation of lay judges, which is presented by the presiding law judge at
the outset of trials, is often accepted by the parties.20 3 As a result valua-
tion decisions are often made by single judges trained in civil law, with
little experience of financial accounting.
In addition to the composition of courts, there are important differ-
ences in the appeals process. German court decisions of first instance
have a much broader scope of reviewability on appeal than their U.S.
200. See supra part II.A.
201. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
202. Sections 105 and 109 of the Court Organization Law (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz or
GVG), establish the principle that commercial tribunals include lay judges who must have
business experience. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG MIT GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ 2261, 2263
(Adolf Baumbach et al. eds., 1988). The Civil Procedure Law (Zivilprozejlordnung or ZPO),
however, provides in § 349(iii) that parties may agree to have their case heard by a single
judge. Id. at 1046.
203. See supra note 131.
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counterparts. Under the appeal process known as Berufung, the inter-
mediate court conducts a complete review of the facts as well as the
law,2 4 The substance of valuation decisions is thus potentially appeal-
able. These distinctions color the comparative significance of German
and U.S. judicial involvement in the valuation process.
6. Underlying Assumptions of Company Law
Apart from these technical details of laws' application, a comparison
between U.S. and German approaches can also illuminate basic assump-
tions of company law. Procedures considered essential for achieving
justice in one system can be unthinkable in another. The fact that one
system finds a procedure unthinkable whereas another system takes it
for granted forces an observer to reflect on assumptions that shape the
way in which legal problems and their remedies are conceived. The
German doctrine of expulsion provides an excellent example of this
process.
From the time over six decades ago when German commentators
began addressing the shortcomings of statutory dissolution as a remedy
for intra-company disputes, the doctrine of expulsion was paired with
that. of withdrawal. They were seen as necessary complements in order
to cover the range of possible plaintiff grievances. Although expulsion is
available in U.S. (and German) partnerships, it has not been considered
appropriate in the U.S. corporate context.
The German doctrine, therefore, is somewhat shocking to the U.S.
observer. It concretely represents the most extreme expression of the
relational vision of corporate reality. U.S. commentators have often
pointed to the course of dealing or relationship between shareholders. In
the U.S. context, however, such analysis usually revolves around the
notion of fiduciary obligation. U.S. shareholders are not normally
charged with such general obligations towards each other. As we have
seen, U.S. doctrine usually focuses on "oppression." The implications of
focusing on the underlying relationship between the parties as the es-
sence of a company have not been systematically explored by the U.S.
legal system. As we have seen, in Germany they have been explored on
a theoretical level and also put into practice.
The relational and communitarian rhetoric of corporate law has been
central to the German legal system's attempts to grapple with the prob-
204. Later appeals from the intermediate court to the Supreme Court involve the proce-
dure of Revision which, in theory, is restricted to review of legal issues only. See VON
MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 48, at 130-33.
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lem of GmbH dispute resolution. The expulsion remedy represents that
rhetoric carried through to its logical conclusion. In its landmark April
1, 1953 decision, the German Supreme Court addressed this aspect of
the problem directly:
[T]hus the shareholders in a GmbH have a genuine duty of good
faith, not one simply following from the principle of good faith
(242 BGB), because the relationships between a shareholder in the
GmbH and his fellows are not purely capitalist, but also personal.
... If a shareholder destroys the company bond (gesellschaftliche
Verbundenheit) then there is no further room for him in the
GmbH. 2"5
In extending this remedy to situations in which minorities can expel
majority shareholders, German courts have broken completely from the
concept of the sanctity of property interest held by shareholders in their
proportional voice in company management. In doing so, German courts
have held that the good faith obligations of shareholders' relationships
to each other are superior to their voting rights in their company. In
U.S. law, there are also good faith obligations, but they are construed
more narrowly. Most importantly, violation of obligations by a U.S.
majority shareholder only gives a minority shareholder the rights to an
independent cause of action for damages or injunctive relief. In Germa-
ny, a violation can cause the majority shareholder to lose his or her
position in the company entirely and thus extinguish all of his or her
participatory rights.
The issue of expulsion thus presents in sharpest relief the potential
conflict between shareholder control and relational obligations. In con-
fronting this conflict, one must seek to understand why expulsion was
considered a necessary complement to withdrawal. What was the aspect
of a shareholder's interest in the company that could not be adequately
protected without an expulsion remedy? The nature of the relational
rhetoric behind this German development, particularly the extreme
vagueness with which the controlling principles were formulated, raises
difficulties in any legal system. Clear distinctions and deference to
corporate structures, which characterize both the traditional U.S. ap-
proach and the original German statutory provisions, enhance predict-
ability and stability in the system. Such predictability, however, is
bought at the expense of placing some aggrieved shareholders in intoler-
able positions. In evaluating alternative approaches, such as that of
205. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1953, BGH, 9 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 157, 164-65 (F.R.G.) (translated by author).
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Germany, one must ask whether the amelioration of this problem is
worth the danger of abuse inherent in relying on vague concepts coupled
with considerable judicial discretion. An evaluation of alternative ap-
proaches must also take into account the ways in which the German
system itself has sought to minimize these dangers.
CONCLUSION
The German experience with withdrawal and expulsion provide a
range of practical solutions to close corporation problems that can be
helpful for the kind of comparison undertaken in Part II.B. Such a
comparison, however, remains limited to narrow instrumental concerns.
Given the link between the German approaches and deeper assumptions
of German legal culture, these comparisons have broader implications.
The withdrawal and expulsion remedies place the personal aspects
of shareholder relationships at the center of the law's attention. In doing
so, the normative basis for court action has been shifted from the eco-
nomic and contractual concerns, of the GmbH statute and from the clear
rules the statute articulates. When German courts and commentators
have expressed the concerns that this shift addresses, they have general-
ly emphasized two factors. First, they have argued that the law recogniz-
es no legal relationships from which one cannot extricate oneself. Sec-
ond, they have focused on the elements of relationships that impinge
strongly on the shareholders' life experiences. In both cases the underly-
ing principle is what Scholz and others characterize as "personhood"
(Personlichkeit). This longstanding philosophical use of the term
Personlichkeit goes beyond its common business usage, -which often
refers to the corporate personality of a company. In the jurisprudence of
the 1930s and of the postwar period, it has been used by some to ex-
press a view of personal autonomy in which the realization of the self is
closely linked to membership in groups. The value of "personhood"
conflicts with the notion that the application of the law's formal catego-
ries may force shareholders to remain in an intolerable situation against
their will. It would seem, however, that this concern could be fully ad-
dressed by the withdrawal remedy. Withdrawal guarantees all aggrieved
shareholders the right to leave such a situation.
The constant insistence by proponents of the withdrawal and expul-
sion remedies that an expulsion right is necessary indicates that some-
thing more is involved. Expulsion guarantees some aggrieved share-
holders the right to maintain their relationship rather than sever it.
German courts stress that the impact of a relationship on shareholders'
lives provides an independent basis for judicial action. For those sup-
porting this position, the factual relationship between shareholders is
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more than the sum of specific contractual arrangements between individ-
uals. As a social reality, the relationship creates normative obligations
between the parties even in the absence of specific statutory authoriza-
tion. Because the relationship comes before the legal form that effectu-
ates it, its norms can overturn the contractual expectations of parties as
to their voice in the company. To the extent that membership in this
relationship is important to the realization of a shareholder's
"personhood," German courts have sought to protect this interest. Ger-
man courts and commentators rely on the concepts of good faith and
wichtige Grund to provide a link between the harm experienced by
shareholders and the remedies offered by courts. Given the great variety
of circumstances that affect the relationship between shareholders, the
concepts are necessarily vague and open-ended.
As we have seen, the dangers of abuse created by such an approach
are all too real. They had long been admitted as a theoretical possibility,
but dismissed as unlikely in the German context. During the Third
Reich, however, such abuses flourished and,. ironically, their practical
results were applauded by Scholz himself. Nevertheless, postwar Ger-
man courts embrace the approach with apparently benign results. The
struggle within German law to limit the dangers can be seen in the
different approaches to expulsion and withdrawal taken by the system
over the course of this century.
The normative rationales for the German withdrawal and expulsion
remedies have been remarkably consistent throughout the seven decades
in which they have been proposed. This consistency has been adduced
by some postwar observers as supporting the idea that the rationales
behind the remedies are independent of the political abuses they fur-
thered during the Third Reich.2" From this perspective, the Nazi ap-
proach to withdrawal and expulsion is an aberration in a long jurispru-
dential tradition. Unfortunately, such a view is inconsistent with the
historical developments discussed above. Although the normative vocab-
ulary has been consistent, its relationship to its context and the courts'
treatment of it has differed sharply. It was precisely during the Third
Reich that such ideas were accepted into German law. Therefore, rather
than being an aberration, the Nazi period was the formative stage of
such ideas.
The fact that these developments were rooted in an earlier tradition
might lead the observer to draw a conclusion opposite to that of those
who see the jurisprudence of the 1930s as an aberration. Some might
206. See supra part I.A.2.
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see the abuses of that period as a natural and inevitable result of the
normative language and of the legal culture it mirrored. In fact, the
dangers of the approach were obvious, to its proponents from the begin-
ning.20 7 From Windscheid to Scholz, in the field of contracts and later in
that of the GmbH, its proponents recognized its hypothetical dangers,
but remained convinced that the decency of the advanced German legal
system and bureaucracy and the rectitude of German judges made such
concern unnecessary. As we have seen, Scholz continued to make such
arguments at the height of Nazi power. The events of German history
demonstrate that such faith was naive at best.
The argument for the inevitability of abuse, however, does not
accord with the experience of postwar Germany. The basic approach
embraced by postwar courts has been the one enunciated in 1942, not
the earlier Weimar rejection of it. The easy response is to point to the
very different political context. The Third Reich was a totalitarian state
and the Federal Republic is a liberal democracy. To rely in this fashion
on external political factors,, however, replicates the older, confident
assurances that abuses could never be a problem, in Germany. Doing so
also abdicates responsibility for considering the role played by the legal
doctrine itself. One should remember that the careers of many distin-
guished legal experts spanned the three periods discussed above, during
which they articulated similar normative positions. What then should be
the status of ideas in periods of freedom that are capable of abuse when
political circumstances change? This was the problem confronted in
theory during the Weimar era and in hindsight after World War II.
During the Weimar era, courts accepted withdrawal and expulsion
remedies only in limited cases as exceptions to the general rule of
dissolution, and they refused to base the remedies directly on the general
clauses. As the work of Hedeman illustrates, critics were aware of the
danger of abuse inherent in combining judicial discretion with the direct
applicability of general clauses.208 It is ironic that the. Weimar courts'
hesitation to apply general clauses to the GmbH occurred during the
heyday of their application in the field of contracts. As we have seen,
the courts stressed the need for maintaining the formal distinctions
between the GmbH and other forms of business organization. They also
refused to treat the general clauses or the relationship between the
parties as independent bases for judicial intervention in company gover-
nance. Weimar courts insisted in grounding their treatment of the GmbH
in the applicable statutes and the company charter.
207. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text;
208. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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The areas into which the availability of withdrawal and expulsion
were extended were those in which rights were already afforded by
statute or by the company charter. Such an approach has relevance to
the present inquiry on two levels. First, the inherent dangers of the
vague general clauses were limited by subordinating them to clear rules
articulated in the statute. In this context, the general clauses operated at
the margins to provide flexibility and fill gaps. Second, the German
courts' perspective emphasized the contractual expectations of the
parties inter se in terms of the express statutory and corporate provisions
on the basis of which they established their company. The continuing
influence of this approach can be seen in the remarkable decisions of
the lower and intermediate courts in the case of M's Jewishness.2°9
According to those courts, since the parties had entered into business
with M knowing that he was a Jew, they could not complain of his
Jewishness and could not argue that it violated their relationships with
each other.2 '0 These contractual aspects of the case were considered by
the lower courts to outweigh the argument that Jewishness could be a
substantial basis for expulsion.
Formalistic approaches to the law were an inconvenience to the Nazi
regime. The implementation of the Nuremberg laws was not blocked,
but it was rendered more disruptive to the German economy. Share-
holders in companies that were suddenly deemed Jewish corporations
faced great uncertainty. The expulsion remedy urged by legal scholars
provided a vehicle for lessening the disruption caused by the removal of
Jews from the economy (Entjudung). General application of the expul-
sion remedy, however, required a new approach to the application of
general clauses.
As we have seen, Nazi theorists saw the general clauses and factual
relationships as independent sources of legal norms more fundamental
than the positive legal rules that effectuated them. Even so, viewing the
general clauses from the internal perspective of the relationship between
parties would result in an approach similar to that of the lower courts to
the case of M. As in many other areas of the law, the neo-Hegelianism
prominent among many Nazi legal theorists provided a solution. 2 1
209. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
211. Among the leading proponents of neo-Hegelian legal theory during the Third Reich
were Karl Larenz and Carl Schmitt. Larenz remained firmly rooted in traditional Hegelian
approaches. Schmitt stressed the need to move beyond the traditional Hegelian bureaucratic
state and create a new legal theory. See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, STAAT, BEWEGUNG, VOLK -
DIE DREIGLIEDERUNG DER POLITISCHEN EINHEIT (1933); KARL LARENZ, DIE BEDEUTUNG
DER V6LKISCHE SITTE IN HEGELS STAATSPHILOSOPHIE, ZgS 98, 109 (1938); KARL LARENZ,
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Much of the civil and commercial legislation of earlier eras re-
mained unchanged during the Third Reich. It fell to jurisprudential
theorists to create new concepts that could enable these received legal
provisions to acquire new meanings and perform new functions. Nazi
legal theorists saw legal concepts as "concrete general concepts"
(Konkret-allgemeine Begriff) that expressed the reality of life experi-
ence.21 2 Such concepts derived their content from Tdtigkeit [factual
reality]. Tatigkeit was expressed in the same terms as the legal locus of
concern for the impact of the relationships involved in GmbH
shareholding, Lebenstdtigkeit.2 3 This concentration on factual circum-
stances made legal concepts more variable. The concrete general concept
did not, however, mean simply empiricism and flexibility. The factual
reality that its concrete aspect was meant to reflect was itself shaped by
the broader values that linked it to society as a whole. Its general aspect
meant that, once defined, it could be broadly applied as a legal term.
This approach was particularly suited to the general clauses of civil and
commercial law. The necessary link to the programs of the Third Reich
was provided by other concepts common to the rhetoric of the period,
those of the world view (Weltanschauung) and the spirit, of the age
(Zeitgeist). For Nazi theorists, legal concepts were not only factual in
nature, but also dynamic - the product of the changing spirit of the age
interacting with concrete circumstances. From this perspective, the
concrete position of parties, such as those involved in shareholder
disputes, must be understood in terms of the way in which changes in
the governing world view affected their position. When the Supreme
Court revised the lower court's rulings in the case of M, it applied this
approach.14  ,
In the postwar period, though many normative rationales for the
withdrawal and expulsion remedies dating from the Third Reich remain,
their application has been different. Postwar courts rejected the earlier
approach of the Weimar courts, which limited the dangers of general
clauses in the corporate context by subordinating them to statutory
ZUR LOGIK DES KONKRETEN BEGRIFFS - EINE VORUNTERSUCHEN ZUR RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE,
V DRW 279 (1940); KARL LARENZ, RECHTS - uN6 STAATSPHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART
(2d ed. 1935).
212. For a summary of the role of neo-Hegelianism in Nazi jurisprudence, see BERND
ROTHERS, ENTARTETES RECHT: RECHTSLEHREN UND KRONJURISTEN IM DRITTEN REICH
76-85 (1989). An examination of this complex topic goes beyond the scope of this article. It
will be the subject of a forthcoming article by the author on the jurisprudence of the Third
Reich and the postwar German reaction to it.
213. Cf. the use of Lebenstlftigkeit in note 44 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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provisions. The cases discussed above show that courts now base the
two remedies directly on the application of general clauses without
resorting to the statute and continue to emphasize the factual relation-
ship between the parties. In evaluating these relationships, however,
courts do not do so in terms of a general world view. The approaches
discussed in Part I.B and the cases that established them focused on the
position of the parties inter se. The general clause is now viewed in a
more genuinely empirical manner than it was during the Third Reich.
The relationship between the parties, though itself still a source of
norms, is evaluated in its own terms.
When we consider the line of cases that followed the decision of
1953, a clear pattern emerges that establishes procedural requirements
for effectuating the withdrawal and expulsion remedies. The provisions
summarized in Part I.B set out detailed rules for intracompany proce-
dures that must be followed before a suit can be brought. Once in court,
they establish further procedures that limit the scope of the general
clauses' operation. The provisions deal with shareholder voting require-
ments, rules of court procedure, burdens of proof, standards for valua-
tion, and mechanisms for compensating departed shareholders.
The three historical periods in which the withdrawal and expulsion
remedies have been proposed exhibit different responses by the German
legal system to the dangers inherent in reliance on such a vague basis
for judicial intervention. This experience demonstrates the manner in
which instrumental concerns and statutory provisions common to U.S.
and German law developed in fundamentally different directions in
response to historical events. The German and U.S. experiences provide
a basis for evaluating the inevitable tradeoffs between promoting legal
certitude and addressing shareholder grievances. They also show the link
between the narrow technicalities of corporate law and deeper issues of
legal culture. The Weimar courts subordinated general norms to the
clearly articulated rules of the statute, whereas the Third Reich em-
braced those norms as independent sources of legal obligation and saw
their flexibility as necessary to achieving justice in the context of dy-
namically changing factual circumstances. Despite the experience of the
Nazi era, postwar Germany continues to accept with apparently good
results the normative basis for the withdrawal and expulsion remedies
first adopted by the courts in 1942. While accepting the general clauses
and the relationship between the parties as independent sources of
norms, postwar German courts constrain these norms by imposing
elaborate lrocedural requirements. Their approach reflects long experi-
ence with the practical implications of carrying through to its conclusion
the abstract proposition that "a majority position in the company is no
carte blanche . .. ."
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